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General Introduction
December 2, 2008
"Ination is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon." Milton Friedman
Why should we be interested in understanding ination, or the change in the general level of
prices of goods and services? There are basically two reasons. First, in the presence of price adjust-
ment costs ination entails wasteful expenses for rms and generates changes in the distribution of
relative good prices that do not reect changes in productivity. Second, ination a¤ects the real
value of nominal assets, including money. In a market economy the distribution of relative prices
and the real value of assets a¤ect the allocation of the societys resources into consumption, leisure
and investment. Through its e¤ect on real good and asset prices ination ultimately determines
economic welfare. Public policy that aims at maximizing economic welfare thus needs to understand
what drives ination and how it a¤ects the allocation of resources.
In this chapter I introduce the reader to the literature to which this thesis has contributed. As
I go along I also refer to the subsequent chapters to give the reader an idea of how they are related
to this broad literature. I rst give an overview of the costs and benets that are associated with
ination. Then I give a short overview of the features of the New Keynesian model that allows us to
assess the size of the respective costs and benets of ination. Subsequently, I present the features
of the ination and price adjustment data that the model should try to match. Finally, I give a
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brief overview of the relevant literature on optimal policy.
Costs and Benets of Ination
Ination and Costly Price Adjustment Unless price adjustment is costless, the average level
of ination will determine the frequency and thus the costs of resetting nominal prices.1 The
literature often refers to this type of cost as a menu costs referring to the printing costs restaurants
incur when they change prices. Menu costs do not just comprise the costs of physically resetting
prices, but also of reoptimizing the price. There are many decisions to be taken before a price can
be reset.
Firms will not reset their price in response to every change in costs and demand. There will be a
range in between which they will tolerate deviations of their actual price from its optimal level. This
generates a change in the distribution of relative prices that does not reect changes in productivity.
These changes will thus entail e¢ ciency and welfare losses. This cost is often referred to as a relative
price distortion. See Lach and Tsiddon (1992), Hercowitz (1981) and Danziger (1987) for empirical
evidence on the relation between ination and the distribution of relative prices.
There can also be benets of higher ination. In a world where nominal wages cannot adjust
downwardly, higher ination will decrease the real value of nominal wages. If due to certain shocks
optimal real wages need to decrease, then small or zero changes in nominal wages still entail real
wage decreases that are optimal. This e¤ect is due to Tobin (1972) who stressed that in this context
ination can "grease the wheels of the economy". The importance of this e¤ect has recently been
1It seems hard to imagine that price adjustment is completely costless. Di¤erent goods will of course entail
di¤erent costs of price adjustment. The costs will for instance depend on what type of market the good is sold. Is
the good sold in an auction, then the costs of price adjustment might be lower than if the good is sold in a shop.
However, the mere fact that the prices of some goods continuously adjust does not necessarily imply that the cost of
price adjustment is zero. The shocks to the optimal price of this good can be so large that the benets of adjusting
the goods price outweigh the costs of price adjustment.
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studied in Fahr and Smets (2008) and Fagan and Messina (2008).
Ination and the Value of Nominal Assets Ination a¤ects the real value of nominal assets.
This includes the real value of outstanding money balances. In this regard we need to realize
that money is a special type of asset that on top of its function as a store of value, also has a
transactions function. When ination a¤ects the real value of outstanding money balances, this
a¤ects the number of goods that can be purchased in an economy. Cooley and Hansen (1989) use a
model with perfect competition and costless price adjustment. They do not nd signicant e¤ects
of ination on output. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), however, assume imperfect competition and
nd that in combination with sticky prices there are signicant e¤ects of changes in the money supply
on output. This illustrates how the characteristics of ination and price adjustment determine the
welfare e¤ects of monetary policy.
Another cost of ination comes from the combined role of store of value and transaction tech-
nology of money. As holding money is not remunerated, the e¤ective nominal interest rate is zero.
As long as ination is positive, this creates an opportunity cost of holding money balances. On the
other hand, money makes transactions easier. Therefore, ination determines the number of times
someone goes to the bank in order to withdraw money and in such a way tries to save on money
balances. With higher average ination and nominal interest rates people will cut back money
holdings as the opportunity cost increases, whereas the transaction benets stay the same. This
generates more trips to the bank, which explains the origin of the term shoe leather costs. In the
literature this term covers all sorts of costs that are related to more cash management.
Another channel through which ination can a¤ect the aggregate economy is through its role in
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generating real wealth redistributions across di¤erent agents, and more in particular debtors and
creditors. From an aggregate perspective it is not clear whether this is a cost or a benet. It will
depend on whether there is a wealth transfer from people that are unproductive to people that
are productive and invest. Doepke and Schneider (2006) and Meh et al. (2008) are two recent
contributions on the redistributional e¤ects of ination across di¤erent economic agents.
In a model with a role for the government and nominal government debt, surprises in ination
can also create a way to levy nondistortionary taxes. Because the government debt is nominal
the rate of ination will determine the real debt burden the government needs to nance. In the
case of an ination surprise the real government debt will decrease signicantly without distorting
economic activity as taxes on labor and capital do. In e¤ect ination can be a non-distortionary
lump sum tax.
However, higher ination variability will also increase risk premiums on nominal assets. See
for instance De Graeve et al. (2008) for how higher ination variability increases the ination risk
premium that investors demand from nominal assets. A related issue is that for long-term nominal
debt contracts ination will seriously a¤ect the prole of real debt repayments. This can distort the
allocation of investment in housing in a life-cycle model. Another issue is that to hedge themselves
against the risk of ination people will invest more in real assets contrary to nominal assets that
entail more risk.
In the case of negative ination, or deation, the real value of money increases. So holding
money then gives a positive real return. This can become problematic if the real interest rate
should be lower than the rate of deation. In that case the nominal interest rate hits the zero lower
bound, so that the central bank loses control over the interest rate. For a recent example see the
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experience in Japan during the nineties as described by Krugman (1998).
Up to now we have only listed the di¤erent types of the costs and benets of ination. We have
not been able to quantitatively assess the costs and benets, so that we remain unsure about net
welfare e¤ects of ination. This can be done in versions of the so-called New Keynesian model. The
main virtue of this model is that it links the microeconomic price setting decisions of an innite
number of economic agents to the behavior of ination and other macroeconomic variables. In this
way it makes it possible to consider all the aspects of ination and price adjustment in one coherent
framework.
The New Keynesian Model
Today most of the questions raised in the previous section are studied in the so-called New Key-
nesian model. This model has been developed on the basis of a real business cycle model, adding
monopolistic competition, infrequent price adjustment, and a role for monetary policy. The model
is the result of a number of failures in the past that have continuously been xed by using new
frictions or techniques. An excellent overview of this model can be found in Woodford (2003) and
Gali (2008).
This model is basically a real business cycle model with two additional frictions. This allows
economists to prot from the virtues of the real business cycle model and the methodology to address
economic questions. The most important virtues are the explicit use of optimization of agents and
rational expectations. This is much more appealing than the ad hoc behavioral relations that were
posited in the older Keynesian literature. The rst additional ingredient that is present in the New
Keynesian model is monopolistic price setting. Prices are not determined in perfectly competitive
markets so that the price equals the marginal cost of producing an additional unit. Instead, there
5
will be a distortion in output due to the monopoly power of an innite number of di¤erentiated
goods producers. Often these are incorporated in the model using constant elasticity of substitution
consumer preferences as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). A second ingredient are nominal price rigidities
that are often modeled as costs to nominal price adjustment. This gives rise to nominal prices that
are not adjusted continuously, which creates a constraint for the rm when it resets its price. The
combination of imperfect competition and nominal rigidities generates the short run nonneutrality
of monetary policy. Money has not necessarily an explicit role in versions of this model; it is just
a unit of account. But still ination is a purely monetary phenomenon, as suggested by Friedman
and Schwartz (1963). It is ultimately the central bank that determines the price level and thus the
ination rate. Up to today people debate about the fact whether they should include an explicit
role for money in the model or not, through e.g. introducing a cash in advance constraint.
The New Keynesian model can be used to evaluate di¤erent policies, but before we can do that we
rst need to remove a number of remaining uncertainties about the right extent to which di¤erent
frictions are important or not. The success or failure of this framework needs to be evaluated
against a number of properties of both the macroeconomic and microeconomic data. Often the
model is only evaluated against macroeconomic data. This creates a number of observational
equivalences between di¤erent microeconomic models of price adjustment. Because the welfare
e¤ects are crucially depending on the type of price adjustment the researcher assumes we also need
to evaluate the microeconomic implications of the model. Therefore, since the last ve years people
have increasingly studied the characteristics of microeconomic price adjustment using large micro
price datasets. The next two sections, respectively, give an overview of the macroeconomic and
microeconomic statistical properties of the data and discuss what models might be consistent with
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these statistical properties.
Post-WWII Ination Dynamics
Evidence on Ination Persistence The persistence of ination is not easy to model, and it
intrigues policy makers because it is an important determinant of how strong their reaction should
be to changes in the ination rate. A common practice is to estimate a univariate autoregressive
time series model and measure persistence as the sum of the autoregressive coe¢ cients (e.g. Fuhrer
and Moore, 1995; Pivetta and Reis, 2007). In most of these studies, ination is found to exhibit high
to very high persistence during the post-WW II period, i.e. persistence is found to be close to that
of a random walk. We can design models that generate high ination persistence using a variety
of frictions: backward-looking agents (Galí and Gertler, 1999), price indexation (Christiano et al.,
2005), consumption habit persistence (Christiano et al, 2005), learning (Milani, 2007), real wage
rigidities (Blanchard and Galí, 2007). For a particular calibration these frictions will all be able to
replicate the univariate reduced form ination persistence. But it is important to note that this
estimated high persistence is a measure of unconditional ination persistence. The di¤erent frictions
that can match the observed ination persistence will a¤ect the persistence of ination di¤erently.
Some frictions will make ination directly or intrinsically more persistent, whereas other frictions
will make ination persistent through making its drivers persistent. The drivers of ination can
be read o¤ from the Phillips curve relation that generally emerges in New Keynesian models, and
that links current ination to expectations about future ination and a measure of the output gap.
Frictions that make ination intrinsically more persistent typically augment the standard Phillips
curve relation with lags of ination.
In the rst chapter (Dossche and Everaert, 2008), ination persistence is conditional on the type
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of shock moving ination. We distinguish three sources of cyclical ination persistence. First, due
to price indexation or backward-looking agents ination can directly be related to its own lags. We
call this kind of persistence intrinsic ination persistence. Second, due to asymmetric information
or imperfect credibility, private agentsperceptions about the central banks ination target can
di¤er from the true ination target. We call the persistence of such deviations expectations-based
persistence. Third, ination persistence is determined by the persistent movements in the output
gap. We call this type of persistence extrinsic ination persistence. Both expectations-based and
extrinsic persistence can also be labeled inherited ination persistence, because ination inherits
its persistence from the persistent movements in its driving variables. Each of these three types of
ination persistence represent persistence at the business cycle frequency. On top of this, changes in
the long-run ination rate will add a fourth source of ination persistence that is not related to the
business cycle. For designing business cycle models we are only interested in ination persistence
excluding the e¤ect of changes in the long-run ination rate. We use an unobserved component
model to lter out these four di¤erent sorts of ination persistence. The results show that intrinsic
ination persistence is fairly low, i.e. the half-life of a cost-push shock is less than one quarter. We
conclude that a signicant part of the observed univariate ination persistence is inherited and that
price-setting frictions such as indexation to past ination or backward-looking expectations are not
the best way to match the empirical evidence.
This is in line with evidence that the high persistence of ination during the seventies was linked
to the type of monetary policy regime in place (e.g. Benati, 2008). The dynamics of ination went
through substantial changes during the last ve decades. In Table 1 and Figure 1 I distinguish
three periods of di¤erent ination dynamics: the Golden Sixties (1955-1964), the Great Ination:
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1965-1984, and the Great Moderation: 1985-2007. The rst period was characterized by relatively
low ination with little persistence both in the United States and Germany. The second period is
characterized by high, volatile and persistent ination for both the euro area and the United States.
Notice, however, that in Germany this rise in average ination and persistence was much more
muted than in the euro area and the United States. The volatility of ination in Germany even
decreased during that period. In the third period ination is again low and exhibits low persistence.
That is the reason why in the rst chapter we account for changes in the ination target of the
central bank. These changes in the ination target can come through genuine mistakes (Gali and
Gertler, 1999), misperceptions of the natural rates (Orphanides, 2002), or just not knowing the
natural rate principle that ination cannot permanently increase economic activity (Sargent et al.,
2006). To paraphrase Friedman, high ination persistence seems to be always and everywhere a
monetary phenomenon.
Table 1: Statistical Properties of Ination
United States Euro area Germany
1955-1964
Std. 1.32 - 2.09
Mean 1.56 - 2.15
Autocorr. 0.30 - -0.12
1965-1984*
Std. 3.31 2.30 1.94
Mean 6.09 8.38 4.07
Autocorr. 0.82 0.74 0.71
1985-2007
Std. 1.51 1.16 1.66
Mean 3.00 2.59 1.94
Autocorr. 0.29 0.51 0.52
Note: the statistics are computed using the annualized
quarterly log-di¤erenced seasonally adjusted CPI. The
source is OECD, except for the sample 1970-1998 for the
euro area, which comes from the AWM dataset of the
ECB. * The sample for the euro area only covers 1970-
2007.
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Figure 1: Ination across Countries
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Note: The graph shows annualized log-di¤erences of quarterly seasonally ad-
justed CPI. See Table 1 for the data sources.
Evidence from VARs Christiano et al. (1999) survey the literature on evidence on the trans-
mission of monetary policy through estimating the e¤ect of a monetary policy shock on a large
set of macroeconomic variables. They nd that as the nominal interest rate increases, ination,
consumption, investment and output persistently fall. This literature delivers empirical evidence
that structural models should try to match as well as possible. This is done by comparing the
impulse response functions of the data with the impulse response functions implied by the model.
Peersman and Smets (2003) use the same methodology for euro area data and nd very similar
results as for the United States. As this thesis does not do any work in this eld I refer the reader
for more background on this topic to Christiano et al. (1999).
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The Role of Price Setting and Some Evidence
Two assumptions are key in the New Keynesian model. First, there is monopolistic competition in
the goods market. This implies that rms are price setters, and not price takers as would be the
case if markets were perfectly competitive. The second assumption is costly price adjustment. This
assumption always goes together with monopolistic competition as then the price setter can make
a trade-o¤ between adjusting its price or not. Here we give an overview of the di¤erent ways costly
price adjustment is introduced in the model, and what are the micro and macro implications. We
also give an overview of the empirical evidence.
Theoretical Assumptions and Their Implications There are mainly two ways of introducing
costly price adjustment in the New Keynesian model. First, there is so-called time dependent price
setting. Under this assumption some prices in the economy can adjust in the current period, whereas
other prices cannot adjust. Which prices can adjust and which cannot is exogenously determined;
it is not chosen by the rms or price setters. One very popular model is the so-called Calvo
(1983) model that assumes that a randomly chosen fraction of the prices, drawn from a uniform
distribution, can adjust. The model is so popular because it gives rise to very simple optimality
conditions. This implies that some prices will not adjust for ever. Even though there is some
evidence of very long-lasting prices (Young and Levy, 2005), it seems very unlikely that prices do
not adjust even though the rm makes losses and has to meet demand. This has very important
implications for the relative price distortion that this model delivers (Ascari, 2004). Another very
popular model is the so-called Taylor (1980) price adjustment model. This model assumes that
every period there is a xed fraction of rms that can adjust their prices. In this case the fraction
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of prices that can adjust is not random. It is always the same cohort of prices that can adjust
after for instance four quarters. This model does not su¤er from the problems of the Calvo model
(Ascari, 2004).
A second way of introducing costly price adjustment is through explicitly assuming a cost of
price adjustment that the rm needs to pay every time it changes its price. A very popular model
is the so-called menu cost model where there is a xed cost to be paid every time the rm wants
to adjust its price. Because of the non-linearity this implies that it is more di¢ cult to solve the
model using perturbation methods. See Dotsey et al. (1999) for an example of a menu-cost model
that can be solved with a perturbation method. In this model the frequency of price adjustment
is endogenous and does not depend on an exogenous assumption. The rms that need the price
adjustment most urgently adjust their prices. This feature is also called the selection e¤ect (Golosov
and Lucas, 2007). It implies that the response of ination to a monetary shock is much faster than
if the selection e¤ect were not present.
Another often used model is the model of Rotemberg (1982). This model assumes that the
price adjustment cost is quadratic in the size of the price adjustment. So the higher is the price
adjustment the higher is the price adjustment cost. In this model the frequency of price adjustment
is 100%; there is no staggering of price adjustment. This is at odds with the micro data as will
become clear soon. However, in a rst order approximation the model delivers the same Phillips
curve as under the Calvo price adjustment. See Lombardo and Vestin (2008) for a comparison of
the welfare implications of both models.
Another theory is the one recently proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002). This theory does not
assume that prices are reset irregularly because of nominal price rigidities. It assumes that prices
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can be reset every period, but that the rm can only infrequently choose the optimal rate of price
adjustment. So information about the state of the economy is not immediately reected in price
adjustment decisions. This creates a short term impact of money on ouptut.
All the previous models assume that agents are perfectly rational and perfectly informed. This
implies that the natural rate hypothesis is respected. Output cannot be increased forever by in-
creasing the rate of ination. One paper that proposes an alternative to the natural rate hypothesis
is the paper of Akerlof et al (2000). They argue that under low ination price and wage setters
do not fully update their decisions to their expectations. Therefore, slightly higher ination will
push activity higher. As ination gets higher they argue that then agents will start updating their
decisions again with ination expectations. So small deviations of the natural rate hypothesis are
possible and e¢ cient in that model.
Empirical Evidence The body of empirical research on costly price adjustment has been growing
exponentially during the last years. Usually the fact that goods prices do not change is taken as
indirect evidence for costs of price adjustment. Under the assumption that the optimal price changes
continuously through continuously changing costs and demand. For a lot of goods this might be
true, but it could as well be possible that some goodsprices do not change simply because the
costs and demand do not change. On the other hand, there is also limited direct evidence on costly
price adjustment. Levy et al. (1997) and Zbaracki et al. (2004) nd direct evidence for the costs
of price adjustment from a supermarket and an industrial rm, respectively. They nd that price
adjustment costs amount to 0.7% or 1.23% of revenues. Zbaracki et al. (2004) document that the
direct cost of changing prices is very low. However, the managerial and customer costs are quite
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substantial. So to implement a price change a rm needs to spend a lot of resources on organizing
the price change within the rm, and informing and explaining the price change to the customers
of the rm.
Mills (1920) and Means (1927) are the earliest empirical studies of price adjustment. Between
then and the early 2000s there exists a large number of empirical studies of price adjustment. The
main characteristic of these studies is, however, that they only cover a subset of goods traded in
the economy. Some examples are Kashyap (1995) for retail catalogues and Cecchetti (1986) for
magazines. It took until Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) before a large
scale study on US consumer prices was done. At about the same time, the central banks of the euro
area started a large research project within the Ination Persistence Network (IPN). They study
the stickiness of consumer (Dhyne et al., 2006) and producer prices (Vermeulen et al, 2007) using
micro data underlying the CPI and PPI. In addition they study the adjustment of prices through
a survey (Fabiani et al., 2007) sent to rms asking them directly about the way they adjust prices.
This study was similar in approach to the study of Blinder et al. (1998). All these studies allow to
calibrate macroeconomic models that cover almost the entire set of goods traded in the economy.
The main statistic that these studies compute is the frequency of price adjustment, which ranges
between 10% and 30% depending on the time and country the data was sampled from. Next
to that they also study the size of price adjustment and a number of other features of the price
change distribution. The studies nd infrequent price adjustment compared to perfectly competitive
markets. Still, prices adjust too fast to be able to match evidence from VARs on the output and
ination e¤ects of a monetary policy shock in a New Keynesian model. This gave rise to yet another
puzzle.
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To solve this puzzle a series of papers have introduced real price rigidities (Ball and Romer,
1990). Real rigidities refer to strategic complementarity in the price setting decision of rms. A
rm is more reluctant to adjust its price in response to changes in the state of the economy the
less other rms adjust their prices. Di¤erent frictions can generate this strategic complementarity.
One way to introduce strategic complementarity is through the preference specication of Kimball
(1995). In contrast to the traditional Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator, Kimball (1995) no longer
assumes a constant elasticity of demand. The price elasticity of demand becomes a function of
the relative price. A key concept is the so-called curvature of the demand curve, which measures
the price elasticity of the price elasticity. When the curvature is positive, Kimballs preferences
generate a concave or smoothed "kinked" demand curve in a log price/log quantity framework. A
price above the level of the rms competitors increases the elasticity of demand for its product,
so that the rm increasingly loses prots from relative price increases. Conversely, a price below
the level of the rms competitors reduces the elasticity of demand for its product, so that the
rm again increasingly loses prots from relative price decreases. In this way the combination of
small costs to nominal price adjustment and a concave demand curve generates slow adjustment to
changes in the state of the economy. Despite its attractiveness, the literature su¤ers from a lack
of empirical evidence on the curvature of a typical demand curve. Values for the curvature range
from less than 2 to more than 400. The results in chapter 3 (Dossche et al., 2008) support the
introduction of a kinked (concave) demand curve in a representative rm economy, but the median
degree of curvature is much lower than currently calibrated.
Yet another way to introduce real rigidities is by assuming a production chain. In industrialized
countries 40% of the value of a consumption good is typically generated in the distribution stage,
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whereas 60% of its value is generated in the production stage (Burstein et al., 2003). Chapter 2
(Cornille and Dossche, 2008) of this thesis contributes to understanding the way producer prices
adjust. We document producer price adjustment using a Belgian micro price dataset. On average
24% of prices adjust each month, with an average increase/decrease of 6%. So producer prices
adjust more frequently than consumer prices, but their size of adjustment is typically smaller.
A particular feature of the micro data is that the size of price adjustment is large compared
to ination. This implies that there must be large change in relative prices. To match this fact,
one needs idiosyncratic shocks to be able to generate such big price changes (Golosov and Lucas,
2007). Another source of large price changes are price markdowns that are mainly present in micro
consumer data and not in producer price data (Cornille and Dossche, 2008; Vermeulen et al., 2007).
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) argue that one should leave these price changes out to analyze
macroeconomic questions. Kehoe and Midrigan (2007) argue that if one explicitly accounts for
price markdowns in a macro model, the implications of the model are signicantly di¤erent than
from a model without these price markdowns. The di¤erence between the price path that excludes
the markdowns, and the one including the markdowns, is illustrated in Figure 2.
With respect to the Lucas (1976) critique models of price setting raise a lot of issues because
they determine the welfare costs of costly price adjustment. So it is very important to be able
to compare the microeconomic implications for price setting of these model with microeconomic
data. The macroeconomic data cannot deliver a rm conclusion. Evidence from Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2008) and Gagnon (2008) seems to suggest that a time-dependent model is consistent
with an economy with low ination such as the United States today. However, for an economy
with high ination such as Mexico during the Peso crisis of 1994 a state dependent model seems
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Figure 2: Example of a Price Trajectory: Potatoes
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to be more useful. A time-dependent model would fatally fail in matching the increased frequency
of price adjustment as ination reaches higher levels. See also Mackowiak and Smets (2008) for an
assessment of how microeconomic data can guide us in developing correctly microfounded models.
Optimal Ination Dynamics
One very appealing feature of the New Keynesian model is that it is utility based. That means
that households maximize utility when they choose their consumption, labor and savings decisions.
This feature allows the model to conduct optimal public policy.
Another ingredient that is very important is that agents have rational expectations. The policy
maker cannot repeatedly fool or surprise the agents. The policy outcomes will be very di¤erent
under commitment and discretion as the current allocations will depend on the expectations of
what the policy maker will do in the next period. This creates the problem of time inconsistency
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as described in Kydland and Prescott (1977). Under commitment the policy maker has access
to a commitment technology where he can do promises that ex post he also will keep. As the
welfare outcomes under commitment are superior to the outcomes under discretion most people
assume commitment right away. This facilitates the problem. Also because most central banks in
industrialized countries are now considered as independent from politicians that have di¢ culties in
committing themselves to promises.2 However, there still remains a large number of problems that
are better described by discretion, in particular scal policy problems. This lies beyond the scope
of this thesis.
Two distinct branches of the existing literature on optimal policy deliver diametrically opposed
policy recommendations concerning the long-run and cyclical behavior of prices and interest rates.
One branch follows the theoretical framework laid out in Lucas and Stokey (1983).3 It studies the
joint determination of optimal scal and monetary policy in exible-price environments with perfect
competition in product and factor markets. In this group of papers, the government problem consists
in nancing an exogenous stream of public spending by choosing the least disruptive combination
of ination and distortionary income taxes. A key result is that it is optimal for the government to
make ination highly volatile and serially uncorrelated. Under the Ramsey policy, the government
uses unanticipated ination as a lump-sum tax on nancial wealth. This allows the scal authority
to keep income tax rates remarkably stable over the business cycle.
On the other hand, a more recent literature focuses on characterizing optimal monetary policy in
environments with nominal rigidities, and imperfect competition.4 This literature di¤ers from the
2See Cukierman et al. (1992) for evidence on how central bank independence has evolved during the last fty
years.
3See e.g. Chari et al. (1991).
4See e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). Clarida Gali Gertler (1999), Goodfriend and King (1997)
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other branch in two important ways. First, it assumes explicitly or implicitly that the government
has access to lump sum taxes to nance its budget. An important implication of this assumption
is that there is no need to use unanticipated ination as a lump-sum tax; regular lump sum taxes
take up this role. Second, the government is assumed to be able to implement a production subsidy
to eliminate the distortion from the presence of monopoly power in the goods and factor markets.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a,b) merge these two literatures. In Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2004b) they assume imperfect competition, sticky prices, nominal non-state-contingent debt and
distortionary income taxes. The government faces a trade-o¤ in choosing the path of ination. On
the one hand, the government would like to use unexpected ination as a non-distorting tax on
nominal wealth. In this way, the scal authority could minimize the need to vary distortionary
income taxes over the business cycle. On the other hand, changes in the rate of ination come at
a cost, for rms face nominal rigidities. The main result of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b) is
that under plausible calibrations of the degree of price stickiness, this trade-o¤ is overwhelmingly
resolved in favor of price stability. The Ramsey allocation delivers a stable ination process. The
implication for scal policy is that in response to an unexpected increase in government spending
the Ramsey planner does not generate a surprise increase in the price level. Instead, he chooses to
nance the increase in government purchases partly through an increase in income tax rates and
partly through an increase in public debt.
In the fourth chapter of the thesis (Dossche, 2008) I show that in a New Keynesian model
economy with sticky prices and high labor taxes, optimal ination volatility is signicantly higher
than for an economy with low labor taxes. Because the marginal tax revenue decreases in the level
of taxes, the Ramsey planner needs to raise taxes more to nance the same adverse government
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spending shocks. This creates a larger tax distortion than under a low level of labor taxes. To
minimize the tax distortion the planner changes taxes less than is needed to entirely nance the
increase in spending and generates a surprise ination to raise revenue from inating the nominal
public debt.
Conclusion
In the last two decades there has been a very high research interest in understanding ination and
price dynamics. First, this success is due to the emergence of a microfounded modeling framework
where people can introduce explicit optimization of agents and rational expectations. This implies
that questions on central bank commitment and discretion could be analyzed in these models.
Second, there is now access to new databases that signicantly increased the microeconomic evidence
on price adjustment. In addition to that there is the macroeconomic evidence from VARs (e.g.
Christiano et al., 1999) combined with evidence on ination persistence.
This thesis has contributed to this research in the way that we provide evidence on the sources
of ination persistence. We nd that a large part of the empirically high ination persistence can
be attributed to changes in the monetary policy ination target. Second, we provide direct evidence
on microeconomic producer price adjustment. This shows that producer prices are more exible
than consumer prices. Third, we nd some, but only limited evidence on real rigidities coming
from changes in the demand elasticity. This implies that some of the challenges the model faces in
terms of matching impulse responses from a monetary policy shock should be resolved using other
sources of strategic complementarity such as multiple sectors, a production chain, or learning. In the
last chapter I nd that changing the scal parameters in realistic dimensions so as to match scal
characteristics in Europe, increases optimal ination and makes it more volatile than for instance
20
in the United States.
Whereas during the eighties and nineties central banks had turned away from formal analysis5,
they are now investing more and more resources in improving the New Keynesian model as well
as using it for policy analysis and forecasting (see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2004, 2007). Already
today the Swedish central bank publishes optimal macroeconomic forecasts. That is nding an
instrument-rate path that minimizes a quadratic loss function under commitment (Adolfson et al.,
2008). This type of analysis is currently becoming an often used tool in many other central banks.
However, recent criticism of the New Keynesian model has also pointed to a number of weak spots
(e.g. Chari et al., 2008; Gottfries and Söderberg, 2008). So when we use these new tools, we should
be aware of their weaknesses and remain careful while formulating policy advice.
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ne the sources of ination persistence at the business cycle frequency as either intrinsic,
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persistence. This indicates that a signicant part of the observed univariate ination persistence is
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1 Introduction
To design business cycle models that can explain cyclical ination dynamics we need to know how
persistent ination is. A common practice is to estimate a univariate autoregressive time series model
and measure persistence as the sum of the autoregressive coe¢ cients (e.g. Nelson and Plosser, 1982;
Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Pivetta and Reis, 2007). In most of these studies, ination is found to exhibit
high to very high persistence during the post-WW II period, i.e. persistence is found to be close to
that of a random walk.
We can design models that generate high ination persistence using a variety of frictions: backward-
looking agents (Galí and Gertler, 1999), price indexation (Christiano et al., 2005), consumption habit
persistence (Christiano et al, 2005), learning (Milani, 2007), real wage rigidities (Blanchard and Galí,
2007). For a particular calibration these frictions will all be able to replicate the univariate reduced
form ination persistence. But it is important to note that this estimated high persistence is a measure
of unconditional ination persistence. The di¤erent frictions that can match the observed ination
persistence will a¤ect the persistence of ination di¤erently. Some frictions will make ination directly
or intrinsically more persistent, whereas other frictions will make ination persistent through making
its drivers persistent. The drivers of ination can be read o¤ from the Phillips curve relation that
generally emerges in New Keynesian models, and that links current ination to expectations about
future ination and a measure of the output gap. Frictions that make ination intrinsically more
persistent typically augment the standard Phillips curve relation with lags of ination.
We provide evidence that can help identify which frictions are important to match the observed
ination persistence. We disentangle ination persistence in a number of economically meaningful
sources. We loosely follow Angeloni et al. (2006) in distinguishing three sources of cyclical ination
persistence. First, due to price indexation or backward-looking agents ination can directly be related to
its own lags. We call this kind of persistence intrinsic ination persistence. Second, due to asymmetric
information (Andolfatto et al., 2007) or imperfect credibility (Erceg and Levin, 2003), private agents
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perceptions about the central banks ination target can di¤er from the true ination target. We
call the persistence of such deviations expectations-based persistence. Third, ination persistence is
determined by the persistent movements in the output gap. We call this type of persistence extrinsic
ination persistence. Both expectations-based and extrinsic persistence can also be labeled inherited
ination persistence, because ination inherits its persistence from the persistent movements in its
driving variables. Each of these three types of ination persistence represent persistence at the business
cycle frequency. On top of this, changes in the long-run ination rate will add a fourth source of ination
persistence that is not related to the business cycle. For designing business cycle models we are only
interested in ination persistence excluding the e¤ect of changes in the long-run ination rate.1 It is
widely accepted that this long-run ination rate is determined by the central banks ination target.2
We use an unobserved component model to lter out these four di¤erent sorts of ination persistence.
This type of model can decompose a time series in a number of distinct components. This is particularly
useful given the di¤erent sources of ination persistence we want to measure. See Canova (2007) for
how this ltering method compares to other methods for extracting cyclical information from the data.
We estimate the parameters of the lter using Bayesian estimation techniques. As the number of
parameters is quite large we get the same problem of overtting as in the case of VARs (Canova, 2007).
To overcome this problem we use prior information from a number of older studies using similar models
as ours. We estimate ination persistence for the euro area and the U.S. The results show that intrinsic
ination persistence is fairly low, i.e. the half-life of a cost-push shock is less than one quarter. We
conclude that a signicant part of the observed ination persistence is inherited and that price-setting
frictions such as indexation to past ination or backward-looking expectations are not the best way to
match the empirical evidence.
1Recently, a number of authors has estimated measures of ination persistence corrected for changes in the long-run
ination rate. See e.g. Altissimo et al. (2006), OReilly and Whelan (2005), Pivetta and Reis (2007), Levin and Piger
(2004), Ireland (2007), Gadzinski and Orlandi (2004), Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005), and Benati (2004).
2Although ination targeting is a monetary policy strategy that only emerged in the 1990s, we will still use this
framework for the 1970s and 1980s. It enables us to identify the implicit ination target of central banks from their policy
choices.
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2 An Unobserved Component Model
In this section, we present an unobserved component model for ination which takes into account (i)
possible shifts in the central banks ination target, (ii) expectations-based persistence, (iii) intrinsic
persistence and (iv) extrinsic persistence. We use a variant of the Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)
model to impose some economic structure. The state space representation of the model is given in
Appendix A.
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Where t is the observed ination rate, Pt is the perceived ination target, 
T
t is the central banks
ination target and zt is the output gap, i.e. the percentage deviation of real output from potential
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output. L is the lag operator so that Lit = t i.
Equation (2) species Tt as a random walk process, i.e. shifts in the central banks ination target
are assumed to be permanent. This assumption is consistent with general equilibrium models where
long-run ination is usually pinned down by the ination target of the central bank. Shifts in Tt
are unlikely to be passed on to ination expectations immediately. Castelnuovo et al. (2003) present
data on long-run ination expectations. These suggest that in the aftermath of shifts in monetary
policy, convergence towards the new equilibrium evolves smoothly over time. Even if the central bank
clearly announces a new ination target, it can take quite some time before the new policy target is
incorporated into long-run ination expectations of private agents (Castelnuovo et al., 2003). This is
often attributed to asymmetric information and signal extraction or imperfect credibility (see e.g. Erceg
and Levin, 2003 and Andolfatto et al., 2007). Agents must then form expectations about the ination
target Tt . Equation (3) introduces the perceived ination target 
P
t , which captures the private agents
beliefs about the central banks ination target Tt .
The perceived ination target Pt+1 is dened as a weighted average of 
P
t and 
T
t+1, where 2t is
a zero mean white noise process. Note that shocks to the perceived ination target, 2; only have a
short-run impact on P . These shocks should be interpreted as misperceptions of private agents about
the central banks ination target. Shocks to the central banks ination target, 1; have a unit long-run
impact on P ; i.e. T is the long-run ination rate. This is consistent with the widely accepted view
that long-run ination is a purely monetary phenomenon.
Equation (1) is a Phillips curve relation, linking the observed ination rate t to the perceived
ination target Pt , q lags of ination and the lagged output gap zt 1. The perceived ination target
Pt is the ination rate consistent with the private agentsination expectations. Therefore, it serves as
the medium-run ination anchor. Both shocks to the output gap zt 1 and cost-push shocks "1t induce
temporary deviations of t from Pt . The sluggish adjustment of t in response to cost-push shocks "1t
is measured by the sum of the AR coe¢ cients, '. The sluggish adjustment of t in response to output
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gap shocks is determined, besides the intrinsic ination persistence, by the persistence of the output
gap zt. We call this source of ination persistence extrinsic ination persistence.
We assume that all shocks are mutually independent zero mean white noise processes. The interest
rate rule in equation (4) infers on the stance of monetary policy through comparing the central banks
key nominal interest rate, it, with a measure for the neutral stance of monetary policy. Following
Laubach and Williams (2003), this measure is assumed to be the natural short-run nominal interest
rate
 
rt + Pt

, where rt is the time-varying real short-term interest rate consistent with output equal
to potential. As the perceived ination target Pt is the medium-run ination anchor consistent with
long-run ination expectations, rt + Pt is the medium-run nominal interest rate anchor for monetary
policy. The term (t 1 Tt ) captures the reaction of the central bank to deviations of ination from its
target, i.e. monetary authorities will increase the nominal interest rate it when observed ination t 1
lies above the ination target Tt . The lagged interest rate it 1 introduces a degree of nominal interest
rate smoothing or policy inertia (see e.g. Amato and Laubach, 1999; English et al., 2003; Erceg and
Levin, 2003). We assume that the policy parameters 1 and 2 are time-invariant. Although Clarida
et al. (1998) nd that the policy parameters are unstable in a number of countries, this assumption
is not in contradiction with their results. They estimate the parameters conditional on a constant
ination target, whereas we estimate the ination target conditional on constant policy parameters.
Both strategies are observationally equivalent. The reason why we do so is that we are interested in
the implied time-varying ination target and not in the policy parameters. For examples of the same
approach see e.g. Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2005).
Equation (5) decomposes the log of real output yrt into potential output y
P
t and the output gap zt.
Equation (6) relates the output gap zt to its own lags and a term
 
it 1   Pt 1   rt 1

which captures
monetary policy transmission. Following Harvey (1985), Stock and Watson (1998) and Laubach and
Williams (2003), equations (7)-(8) model potential output as a random walk with drift, where the drift
term t varies over time according to a random walk process. The time-variation in t allows for the
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possibility of permanent changes in the trend growth of real output, e.g. the productivity slowdown of
the early 1970s.
Laubach and Williams (2003) argue that the natural real rate of interest varies over time due to
shifts in the trend growth of output and other factors such as households rate of time preference.
Therefore, equation (9) relates the real short-term interest rate rt to the trend growth in potential
output t and a component  t that captures other determinants like time preferences.  t is assumed
to be an AR process that, depending on the value for , can be either stationary or non-stationary.
3 Data, Estimation and Results
3.1 Data
We use quarterly data for the euro area and the United States from 1970:1 to 2005:4.3 The ination
series t is the annualized rst di¤erence of the log of the seasonally adjusted GDP deator. For the
interest rate, it, we use the annualized central bank key interest rate. This interest rate should be most
appropriate to infer changes in the central banks behavior. Real output, yrt , is measured as the log of
seasonally adjusted GDP at constant prices. See Appendix B for a more detailed data description.
3.2 Bayesian Estimation
To calculate the likelihood function of our model we write it in state space form (see the Appendix)
and use the Kalman lter. The Kalman lter algorithm requires that parameter vector  of the model
is known. One approach is to derive, from the exact Kalman lter, the di¤use loglikelihood function
for our model (de Jong, 1991; Koopman and Durbin, 2000; Durbin and Koopman, 2001) and replace
the unknown parameter vector  by its maximum likelihood estimate. This is not the approach we
pursue here. First, given the fairly large number of unknown parameters, the numerical optimization of
the sample loglikelihood function is di¢ cult. As a lot of the unknown parameters in  were estimated
previously for di¤erent countries and samples we analyze the state space models from a Bayesian point
3Although the euro area did not exist for the larger part of our data sample (1970:2-1998:4), we use synthetic data
aggregating the national data (Fagan et al., 2005). We implicitly assume that the euro area was an economy with a
homogeneous monetary policy over the entire sample.
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of view, i.e. we treat  as a random parameter vector with a known prior density p ( ). We estimate the
posterior densities p ( j y; x) for the parameter vector  , by combining prior information contained in
p ( ) and sample data in y and x denoting vectors of data for the endogenous and exogenous variables.
This boils down to calculating the posterior mean g:
g = E [g ( ) j y; x] =
Z
g ( ) p ( j y; x) d (15)
where g is a function which expresses the moments of the posterior densities p ( j y; x) in terms of the
parameter vector  . See the Appendix for more details on the estimation method.
Prior Information
We include prior information about the unknown parameter vector  in Table 1 through the prior
density p ( ). Where possible prior information is taken from previous studies. We use the same priors
for the euro area and the United States. If no adequate information is available, we leave considerable
uncertainty around the chosen priors. The prior distribution is assumed to be Gaussian for all elements
in  , except for the variance parameters, which are assumed to be gamma distributed.
The priors for the AR coe¢ cients 'i are chosen from studies allowing for a break in the mean of the
ination rate. Levin and Piger (2004) for instance nd a value of 0.36 for the sum of the AR coe¢ cients
of the United States GDP deator. Gadzinski and Orlandi (2004) nd a somewhat higher gure of 0.6
for the euro area. We choose a prior for the sum of the AR coe¢ cients of 0.4 for both the United States
and the euro area. As these parameter values are important for our question, we leave a large degree
of uncertainty around the priors values. Our prior for  is 0.15, which is close to the parameter values
determining signal extraction in Erceg and Levin (2003) and Kozicki and Tinsley (2005). The prior for
the variance of the ination target shocks 21 is close to the evidence Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) and
Smets and Wouters (2005) nd. For the impact of the lagged output gap on ination we choose a value
of 0.2. As we use annualized quarterly ination this value is consistent with a lot of studies reporting
a value of 0.05 for the output gap impact on the ination rate. The AR coe¢ cients of the output gap
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equation are chosen in order to generate a hump-shaped response of output in reaction to a shock.
This feature is often found in previous empirical studies (Gerlach and Smets, 1999; Rudebusch and
Svensson, 1999; Laubach and Williams, 2003; Rudebusch, 2005). The parameter value for 2 assumes
considerable interest rate smoothing (Smets and Wouters, 2005). The parameter values for 1 and 2
are chosen so that the Taylor (1993) principle

1 + 11 2 = 1:5 > 1

holds for deviations of Pt from
Tt . The central bank reacts less vigorously

1
1 2 = 0:5

in response to deviations of t from Tt .
This is consistent with the view that an ination-targeting central bank should stabilize ination in the
medium run and pay less attention to short-term deviations.
Table 1: Prior information
Reference(s) 5% Mean 95%
'1 - 0.04 0.20 0.36
'2 - -0.06 0.10 0.26
'3 - -0.11 0.05 0.21
'4 - -0.11 0.05 0.21
4X
i=1
'1 Gadzinski et al. (2004), Levin et al. (2004) 0.16 0.40 0.64
 Erceg et al. (2003), Kozicki et al. (2003) -0.01 0.15 0.31
1 Gerlach et al. (1999), Rudebusch (2005), Rudebusch et al. (1999) 0.18 0.20 0.22
2 Gerlach et al. (1999), Rudebusch (2005), Rudebusch et al. (1999) 1.32 1.35 1.38
3 Gerlach et al. (1999), Rudebusch (2005), Rudebusch et al. (1999) -0.50 -0.47 -0.44
4 Gerlach et al. (1999), Rudebusch (2005), Rudebusch et al. (1999) -0.01 0.15 0.31
1 Taylor (1993) 0.02 0.05 0.08
2 Taylor (1993), Smets et al. (2005) 0.87 0.90 0.93
 Laubach et al. (2003) 3.67 4.00 4.33
 Laubach et al. (2003) 0.95 0.97 0.99
2"1 - 0.35 1.30 2.77
2"2 - 0.21 0.30 0.40
2"3 Laubach et al. (2003) 0.11 0.16 0.21
21 Kozicki et al. (2003), Smets et al. (2005) 0.03 0.12 0.25
22 - 2.8e-5 1.0e-4 2.1e-4
23 - 0.4e-3 1.5e-3 3.4e-3
203 Laubach et al. (2003) 0.26 0.37 0.49
24 Laubach et al. (2003) 4.5e-4 6.5e-4 8.8e-4
25 Laubach et al. (2003) 0.07 0.10 0.14
Note: All variances are expressed at annual rates except for 2"3 ; 
2
3
and 24which are expressed as quarterly
rates. The prior distribution is assumed to be Gaussian for all elements in  , except for the variance
parameters which are assumed to be gamma distributed.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Posterior Distribution of the Parameters
Table 2 presents the posterior mean and the 5th and 95th percentile of the posterior distribution of
 for the euro area and the United States. Two important conclusions stand out. First, the intrinsic
ination persistence estimates are 0.45 and 0.73 for the euro area and the United States. In the case of
the United States, intrinsic ination persistence is somewhat higher than in the euro area. Note that
this result is consistent with Galí et al. (2001), who for the United States also nd a relatively higher
degree of backward-lookingness compared to the euro area. Second, expectations-based persistence,
measured by (1  ) ; is at least as high or higher than intrinsic ination persistence, i.e. higher than
0.73 for both economies across the di¤erent models. The persistence in the output gap, measured by
the sum of 2 and 3; is close to 0.9. This implies considerable extrinsic ination persistence.
3.3.2 Posterior Distribution of the States
Figures 1 to 6 show the dynamics of the ination rate together with the central banks ination target
and the perceived ination target, and four shocks. These gures reveal considerable variation in the
central banks ination target in both the euro area and the United States. The dynamics of the
perceived ination target show that ination expectations adjust smoothly in response to shifts in the
central banks ination target.
Figure 1: Ination in the United States
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
19
70
.0
0
19
71
.0
0
19
72
.0
0
19
73
.0
0
19
74
.0
0
19
75
.0
0
19
76
.0
0
19
77
.0
0
19
78
.0
0
19
79
.0
0
19
80
.0
0
19
81
.0
0
19
82
.0
0
19
83
.0
0
19
84
.0
0
19
85
.0
0
19
86
.0
0
19
87
.0
0
19
88
.0
0
19
89
.0
0
19
90
.0
0
19
91
.0
0
19
92
.0
0
19
93
.0
0
19
94
.0
0
19
95
.0
0
19
96
.0
0
19
97
.0
0
19
98
.0
0
19
99
.0
0
20
00
.0
0
20
01
.0
0
20
02
.0
0
20
03
.0
0
20
04
.0
0
20
05
.0
0
Pe
rc
en
t
Perceived inflation target
Central bank inflation target
Inflation
10
Table 2: Posterior Distribution
Euro area United States
5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95%
'1 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.19 0.30 0.40
'2 0.01 0.11 0.21 0.04 0.14 0.24
'3 -0.17 -0.07 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.25
'4 0.06 0.16 0.26 0.05 0.15 0.25
4X
i=1
'i 0.25 0.45 0.64 0.59 0.73 0.88
 0.16 0.27 0.40 0.11 0.27 0.43
1 0.16 0.22 0.29 0.15 0.21 0.28
2 1.23 1.34 1.44 1.26 1.36 1.47
3 -0.48 -0.37 -0.27 -0.53 -0.43 -0.32
4 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
1 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.09
2 0.85 0.89 0.92 0.85 0.88 0.92
 3.38 3.94 4.49 3.42 3.99 4.55
 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.99
2"1 1.23 1.51 1.87 0.99 1.20 1.48
2"2 0.23 0.28 0.34 0.70 0.81 0.94
2"3 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.19
21 0.03 0.08 0.18 0.03 0.08 0.21
22 1.3e-5 5.2e-5 1.6e-4 1.3e-5 5.2e-5 1.6e-4
203 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.32 0.41
24 4.4e-4 6.2e-4 8.5e-4 4.3e-4 6.2e-4 8.6e-4
25 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.15
Note: The approximate covariance matrix b
 is inated
with a factor 1.5. The coe¢ cient of variation of the
weights stabilized after 1 update of the importance
function for both the euro area and the United States.
With n = 10000, the probabilistic error bound for the
importance sampling estimator gnis well below 10%
for all coe¢ cients.
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Figure 2: Shocks in the United States (1)
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Figure 3: Shocks in the United States (2)
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Cost push shock
The timing of the shifts in the central banks ination target seems to be in line with common
knowledge about the historical conduct of monetary policy. A rst disinationary period happens in
the early 1980s. In the United States, the ination target decreased from about 6 p.c. in the late 1970s
to about 4 p.c. in the mid 1980s. This is consistent with the disinationary policy of Paul Volcker,
who was appointed president of the Federal Reserve in 1979. During the Greenspan chairmanship of
the Fed the target came down with an additional 2 percentage points. A similar decrease during the
1980s, from about 7 p.c. to about 5 p.c., is observed for the euro area. This decrease is more di¢ cult to
match with narrative evidence, though, as no unied monetary policy existed before 1999. Still, several
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Figure 4: Ination in the euro area
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Figure 5: Shocks in the euro area (1)
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future euro area member countries (e.g. Austria, Belgium, France, The Netherlands) were disinating
in the beginning of the eighties. For the euro area, a second disinationary period is also present in
the beginning of the nineties. Other future euro area member countries (e.g. Greece, Italy, Portugal,
Spain) were then disinating in order to comply with the Maastricht criteria.
Comparing the shocks, it turns out that the shock to the perceived ination target is not very
important to explain the ination rate. What seems most important is the shock to the ination target
to explain the long run shifts in the ination rate, and the shock to the output gap and the cost push
shock to explain the short run uctuations.
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Figure 6: Shocks in the euro area (2)
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3.3.3 Half-Life and Impulse Response Analysis
An alternative way of analyzing ination persistence is to look at the half life and impulse response
functions of di¤erent shocks to ination. The half-life counts the number of periods for which the e¤ect
of a shock to ination remains above half its initial impact. An important di¤erence with the sum of
estimated AR coe¢ cients as a measure of persistence is that both the half life and impulse response
analysis take all the roots of the AR equation into account while the sum of AR coe¢ cients only
measures the average speed of convergence. A second important di¤erence with the point estimates
of the AR coe¢ cients is that di¤erent sources of persistence in response to a shock can reinforce each
other. The ination dynamics in response to a shock will thus not only depend on the persistence in
the variable that was shocked, but will also depend on the interaction with other variables. Therefore,
also the persistence in the latter will play a role.
Table 4 reports half lives for four shocks to ination. The half life of a cost push shock ("1t) is less
than one quarter. For a shock to the perceived ination target (2t), the half life is 5 and 11 quarters
in the euro area and the United States respectively. For a shock to the output gap ("3t), the half life
even amounts to 35 quarters in the euro area and to 27 quarters the United States. Finally, a shock to
the ination target (1t) is permanent and therefore its half life is equal to innity. The latter result is
obtained by construction because we assume a random walk process for the shifts in the central banks
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ination target. It shows that ignoring a component with an innite half life must create a considerable
bias in the estimates of the other kinds of persistence.
Table 3: Half Lives of Ination (Quarters)
Euro area United States
Cost Push Shock 0 0
Perceived Ination Target Shock 5 11
Output Gap Shock 35 27
Central Bank Target Shock 1 1
Figure 7: Impulse Responses United States
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Note: The responses to a unit shock for the euro area are similar to those for the United
States. To save space we do not report them here.
The responses to a one standard deviation shock convey the same message in Figure 7. A shift in the
central banks ination target (1t) has a permanent impact on ination. Still, it takes various periods
before the ination rate stabilizes at the new target, both in the euro area and in the United States. This
is to a big extent due to considerable expectations-based persistence that creates persistent deviations
of the perceived ination target from the central banks ination target. In case of a temporary
shock to ination ("1t), the convergence to the target goes much faster. According to the sum of the
AR coe¢ cients, intrinsic and expectations-based persistence are not statistically signicantly di¤erent.
Still, due to the persistence in the reaction of the central bank and the output gap, the number of
quarters that ination is a¤ected by a di¤erence between the perceived and the central banks ination
target can be considerably higher. The shock to the perceived ination target does not move ination
15
very much. It thus conrm that this shock is not very important to explain the historical ination
dynamics.
4 Conclusion
To design realistic business cycle models that can explain cyclical ination dynamics we need to know
how persistent ination is. A common practice is to estimate a univariate autoregressive time series
model and measure persistence as the sum of the autoregressive coe¢ cients (e.g. Nelson and Plosser,
1982; Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Pivetta and Reis, 2007). In most of these studies, ination is found to
exhibit high to very high persistence over the post-WW II period, i.e. persistence is found to be close
to that of a random walk.
But it is important to note that this estimated high persistence is a measure of unconditional
ination persistence. Our paper extends the set of statistical ination properties by disentangling
ination persistence in a number of economically meaningful sources. We use an unobserved component
model to lter out four di¤erent sorts of ination persistence. We estimate ination persistence for the
euro area and the U.S. The results show that intrinsic ination persistence is fairly low, i.e. the half-life
of a cost-push shock is less than one quarter. We conclude that a signicant part of the observed
univariate ination persistence is inherited and that price-setting frictions such as indexation to past
ination or backward-looking expectations are not the best way to match the empirical evidence.
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Appendix A: Details on Estimation Method4
A.1 State Space Representation
The unobserved component models outlined in section 2 both include a number of unobserved com-
ponents (Pt ; 
T
t ; :::). In order to estimate these models, it is necessary to write them into state space
form5. In a state space model, the development over time of the system under study is determined
by an unobserved series of vectors 1; : : : ; n, which are associated with a series of observed vectors
y1; : : : ; yn. A general linear Gaussian state space model can be written in the following form:
yt = Zt +Axt + "t; "t  N(0;H); (A.1)
t+1 = Tt +Rt; t  N(0; Q); t = 1; : : : ; n; (A.2)
where yt is a p1 vector of observed endogenous variables, modelled in the observation equation (A:1),
xt is a k  1 vector of observed exogenous variables and t is a m  1 vector of unobserved states,
modelled in the state equation (A:2). The disturbances "t and t are assumed to be independent
sequences of independent normal vectors. The matrices Z; A; T; R; H; and Q are parameter matrices.
yt =

t it y
r
t
0
; xt =

t 1 t 2 : : : t q yt 1 yt 2 it 1
0
;
t =

Tt 
P
t 
P
t 1 yPt yPt 1 yPt 2 t t 1  t  t 1
0
;
A =
24 '1 '2 : : : 'q 1 0 01 0 : : : 0 0 0 2
0 0 : : : 0 2 3  4
35;
Z =
24 0 (1 Pqi=1 'i) 0 0  1 0 0 0 0 0 1 (1  2) 0 0 0 0 (1  2)  0 (1  2) 0
0 0 4 1  2  3 0 4 0 4
35;
4The method outlined in this section was implemented using a set of GAUSS procedures. The code of these procedures
is available from the authors on request.
5See e.g. Durbin and Koopman (2001) for an extensive overview of state space methods.
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T =
2666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 (1  ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
3777777777777775
; R =
2666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0
 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
3777777777777775
"t =

"1t "2t "3t
0
; t =

1t 2t 
0
3t 4t 5t
0
;
Ht =
24 2"1 0 00 2"2 0
0 0 2"3
35; Qt =
2666664
21 0 0 0 0
0 22 0 0 0
0 0 23 0 0
0 0 0 24 0
0 0 0 0 25
3777775
A.2 Kalman Filter and Smoother
Assuming that Z; A; T; R; H; and Q are known, the purpose of state space analysis is to infer the
relevant properties of the ts from the observations y1; : : : ; yn and x1; : : : ; xn. This can be done
through the subsequent use of two recursions, i.e. the Kalman lter and the Kalman smoother. The
objective of ltering is to obtain the distribution of t, for t = 1; : : : ; n, conditional on Yt and Xt, where
Yt = fy1; : : : ; ytg and Xt = fx1; : : : ; xtg : In a linear Gaussian state space model, the distribution of
t is entirely determined by the ltered state vector at = E (t j Yt; Xt) and the ltered state variance
matrix Pt = V ar (t j Yt; Xt) : The (contemporaneous) Kalman lter algorithm (see e.g. Hamilton,
1994, or Durbin and Koopman, 2001) estimates at and Pt by updating, at time t, at 1 and Pt 1 using
the new information contained in yt and xt. The Kalman lter recursion can be initialized by the
assumption that 1  N(a1; P1). In practice, a1 and P1 are generally not known though. Therefore,
we assume that the distribution of the initial state vector 1 is
1 = V   +R00; 0  N (0; Q0) ;    N (0; Ir) ; (A.3)
where the m  r matrix V and the m  (m  r) matrix R0 select the r elements of the state vector
that are non-stationary and the m   r elements that are stationary respectively. They are composed
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of columns of the identity matrix Im and are dened so that, when taken together, their columns
constitute all the columns of Im and V 0R0 = 0: The unconditional variance matrix Q0 of the stationary
elements of the state vector is positive denite and can be computed from the model parameters. The
r  1 vector   is a vector of unknown random quantities which, as we let !1, is referred to as the
di¤use vector. This leads to
1  N(0; P1); P1 = P1 + P; (A.4)
where P1 = V V 0 and P = R0Q0R00. The Kalman lter is modied to account for this di¤use
initialization implied by letting  ! 1 by using the exact initial Kalman lter introduced by Ansley
and Kohn (1985) and further developed by Koopman (1997) and Koopman and Durbin (2003).
Subsequently, the Kalman smoother algorithm is used to estimate the distribution of t, for
t = 1; : : : ; n, conditional on Yn and Xn, where Yn = fy1; : : : ; yng and Xn = fx1; : : : ; xng. Thus, the
smoothed state vector bat = E (t j Yn; Xn) and the smoothed state variance matrix bPt = V ar (t j Yn; Xn)
are estimated using all the observations for t = 1; : : : ; n: In order to account for the di¤use initialization
of 1, we use the exact initial state smoothing algorithm suggested by Koopman and Durbin (2003).
A.3 Bayesian Analysis
In principle, the integral in equation (15) can be evaluated numerically by drawing a sample of n
random draws of  , denoted  (i) with i = 1; : : : ; n, from p ( j y; x) and then estimating g by the
sample mean of g ( ). As p ( j y; x) is not a density with known analytical properties, such a direct
sampling method is not feasible, though. Therefore, we switch to importance sampling. The idea is
to use an importance density g ( j y; x) as a proxy for p ( j y; x), where g ( j y; x) should be chosen
as a distribution that can be simulated directly and is as close to p ( j y; x) as possible. By Bayes
theorem and after some manipulations, equation (15) can be rewritten as
g =
R
g ( ) zg ( ; y; x) g ( j y; x) d R
zg ( ; y; x) g ( j y; x) d (A.5)
23
with
zg ( ; y; x) =
p ( ) p (y j  )
g ( j y; x) (A.6)
Using a sample of n random draws  (i) from g ( j y; x) ; an estimate gn of g can then be obtained as
gn =
nX
i=1
g

 (i)

zg

 (i); y; x

nX
i=1
zg

 (i); y; x
 = nX
i=1
wig

 (i)

(A.7)
with wi
wi = z
g

 (i); y; x

=
nX
i=1
zg

 (i); y; x

(A.8)
the weighting function reecting the importance of the sampled value  (i) relative to other sampled
values.
Geweke (1989) shows that if g ( j y; x) is proportional to p ( j y; x) ; and under a number of weak
regularity conditions, gn will be a consistent estimate of g for n!1.
A.4 Computational Aspects of Importance Sampling
As a rst step importance density g ( j y; x), we take a large sample normal approximation to p ( j y; x),
i.e.
g ( j y; x) = N
b ; b
 (A.9)
where b is the mode of p ( j y; x) obtained from maximizing
log p ( j y; x) = log p (y j  ) + log p ( )  log p (y) (A.10)
with respect to b and where b
 denotes the covariance matrix of b . Note that p (y j  ) is given by the
likelihood function derived from the exact Kalman lter and we do not need to calculate p (y) as it
does not depend on  .
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In drawing from g ( j y; x) ; e¢ ciency was improved by the use of antithetic variables, i.e. for each
 (i) we take another value e (i) = 2b   (i); which is equiprobable with  (i). This results in a simulation
sample that is balanced for location (Durbin and Koopman 2001).
As any numerical integration method delivers only an approximation to the integrals in equation
(A:5), we monitor the quality of the approximation by estimating the probabilistic error bound for the
importance sampling estimator gn (Bauwens, Lubrano and Richard 1999, chap. 3, eq. 3.34). This error
bound represents a 95% condence interval for the percentage deviation of gn from g. It should not
exceed 10%. In practice this can be achieved by increasing n, except when the coe¢ cient of variation of
the weights wi is unstable as n increases. An unstable coe¢ cient of variation of wi signals poor quality
of the importance density. This was exactly the problem encountered in the empirical analysis.
Note that the normal approximation in equation (A:9) selects g ( j y; x) in order to match the
location and covariance structure of p ( j y; x) as good as possible. One problem is that the normality
assumption might imply that g ( j y; x) does not match the tail behavior of p ( j y; x). If p ( j y; x)
has thicker tails than g ( j y; x), a draw  (i) from the tails of g ( j y; x) can imply an explosion of
zg

 (i); y; x

. This is due to a very small value for g ( j y; x) being associated with a relatively large
value for p ( ) p (y j  ), as the latter is proportional to p ( j y; x). Importance sampling is inaccurate
in this case as this would lead to a weight wi close to one, i.e. gn is determined by a single draw  
(i).
This is signaled by instability of the weights and a probabilistic error bound that does not decrease in
n.
In order to help prevent explosion of the weights, we change the construction of the importance
density in two respects (Bauwens et al. 1999, chap. 3). First, we inate the approximate covariance
matrix b
 a little. This reduces the probability that p ( j y; x) has thicker tails than g ( j y; x). Second,
we use a sequential updating algorithm for the importance density. This algorithm starts from the
importance density dened by (A:9), with ination of b
, estimates posterior moments for p ( j y; x)
and then denes a new importance density from these estimated moments. This improves the estimates
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for b and b
. We continue updating the importance density until the weights stabilize. The number of
importance samples n was chosen to make sure that the probabilistic error bound for the importance
sampling estimator gn does not exceed 10%.
Appendix B: Data
The sample of all data we use runs from 1970:2 to 2005:4.
 Ination: quarterly ination rate, dened as 400(lnPt  lnPt 1); with Pt the seasonally adjusted
quarterly GDP deator. Sources: Area Wide Model (Fagan et al, 2005) and Bank for International
Settlements;
 Real output: quarterly output, dened as 100ln(GDPt), with GDPt the seasonally adjusted
quarterly GDP in constant prices. Sources: Area Wide Model (Fagan et al, 2005) and Bank for
International Settlements;
 Key interest rate: quarterly central bank key interest rate. Sources: European Central Bank
and Bank for International Settlements.
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1 Introduction
The way producer prices adjust is important in macroeconomics for at least three reasons. First,
producer prices play an important role in models with intermediate goods.1 The adjustment of pro-
ducer prices determines how shocks to production costs and demand for intermediate goods are passed
through to consumer prices. In a model with intermediate goods and an ination targeting central
bank the extent of producer price stickiness determines the optimal weight the central bank attaches
to producer versus consumer price ination.2 Second, producer prices play an important role in recent
models of open economies and exchange rate pass-through. In these models only intermediate goods
are tradable, whereas consumer goods are a combination of intermediate goods and non-tradable retail
services.3 Third, even to calibrate macroeconomic models that abstract from the distinction between
consumer and producer prices, one would ideally combine empirical evidence from consumer and pro-
ducer prices. In industrialized countries 40% of the value of a consumption good is typically generated
in the distribution stage, whereas 60% of its value is generated in the production stage (Burstein et al.,
2003). Combining evidence from both prices is at least important if there are signicant di¤erences in
the way both sorts of prices adjust. For the United States, for instance, Bils and Klenow (2004) nd
more frequent price changes than the survey evidence of Blinder et al. (1998). They suggest that this
di¤erence might be due to Blinder et al. (1998) mainly surveying intermediate products.
The purpose of this paper is to gather a set of empirical facts about producer price adjustment that
can be used when calibrating the supply side of macroeconomic models. We compare some of these facts
to facts about consumer price adjustment, and document the determinants of producer price adjustment
in response to sectoral and aggregate shocks. We nd that producer price adjustment does not di¤er
much qualitatively from consumer price adjustment. However, there are some quantitative di¤erences
that should be important enough not to be neglected when calibrating models with intermediate goods.
1E.g. Blanchard (1983), Basu (1995) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2007b).
2Huang and Liu (2005) show that the relative weight of producer price ination is a function of its stickiness. If
producer prices approach full exibility, the weight in the objective function goes to zero.
3E.g. Burstein et al. (2003) and Corsetti and Dedola (2005).
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Contrary to Bils and Klenows (2004) conjecture, we nd that producer price adjustment happens more
frequently, but is smaller-sized than consumer price adjustment. Di¤erences in the degree of competition
or price adjustment costs seem necessary to explain the di¤erence between consumer and producer price
adjustment. We also nd that di¤erences in frequencies of price adjustment within the producer sector
are strongly related to di¤erences in the cost structure, in particular the share of energy and labor
costs. Finally, aggregate price adjustment is to a large extent driven by variation in the relative share
of upward and downward price adjustment.
We contribute to a limited number of studies analyzing producer price adjustment as opposed to
a rapidly growing number of studies of consumer price adjustment.4 The paper uses prices covering
nearly the entire Belgian industrial sector and is written within the Eurosystem Ination Persistence
Network (IPN), a network of euro area central bank researchers.5 Vermeulen et al. (2007) summarize a
number of euro area ndings on producer price adjustment, conrming their robustness across individual
countries. For the United States there exists evidence on producer price adjustment too, albeit limited.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2007a) focus only on producer prices for nished goods. Carlton (1986)
analyzes a relatively old sample recorded from 1957 to 1966.
In Section 2 we describe the dataset. In Section 3 we gather a number of facts characterizing
producer price adjustment, and compare some of them with facts about consumer price adjustment.
In Section 4 we investigate the determinants of producer price adjustment in response to sectoral and
aggregate shocks. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
Our dataset consists of price records collected by the Belgian National Statistics Institute (NSI) to
compute the Belgian producer price index (PPI). The PPI is a short-term indicator measuring monthly
4A non-exhaustive list of studies covering almost all consumer products is Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura
and Steinsson (2007a) for the United States, Dhyne et al. (2006) for the euro area, Higo and Saita (2007) for Japan and
Gagnon (2007) for Mexico.
5Other studies of producer price adjustment within the IPN are Dias et al. (2004) for Portugal, Álvarez et al. (2005)
for Spain, Gautier (2006) for France, Sabbatini et al. (2006) for Italy, and Stahl (2006) for Germany.
3
price developments of industrial products. The common European rules concerning the collection of
prices have been established in a number of European Council and Commission Regulations (Eurostat,
2002). Prices are recorded ex-factory, including all duties and taxes except VAT. They refer to actual
transaction prices, not list prices. Each price record refers to the time the order is placed, and not the
time the commodities leave the factory. The prices are collected through a monthly survey, in which
each rm takes part voluntarily.
The NSI allowed access to its micro data for research under strict condentiality. The micro data
we have access to cover 83% of the PPI. The price records corresponding to the 17% of the PPI we did
not get access to mainly refer to the export market. The prices are quoted in euro, and for each price
quote we observe a branch of economic activity code6, a rm code, a code identifying whether the price
is valid in Belgium or abroad, a code describing the product version, and the month and year the price
was recorded. The sample contains over 100,000 price level observations from January 2001 to January
2005 of around 1,500 rms. This implies a seasonally balanced sample of monthly price changes from
February 2001 to January 2005. The average number of price quotes per month is 2,100.7 Firms may
not report a price during a certain month, or even stop participating in the survey so that the coverage
of the dataset slightly varies across months. When the price of a product is no longer observed, the
product is replaced by a close substitute from the same rm. This replacement implies the end of the
price trajectory for the old product, and implies the start of the price trajectory for the new product.
The dataset contains only 214 product replacements, implying an average replacement rate of 0.2%.
This is low compared to the 3% that Klenow and Kryvtsov (2007) report for U.S. consumer prices. We
do not observe any product introductions or retirements in our sample. The low degree of substitution
and product introduction/retirement could be explained by the fact that rms in our survey are asked
for their most important product, which is probably more established and has a lower chance of leaving
6We observe the 8-digit PRODCOM code. PRODCOM stands for PRODucts of the European COMmunity.
7During the rst months of 2001 the dataset covers only about 1,800 price quotes per month. If we discard the rst
months of 2001, the condition to have a seasonally balanced sample would imply that all observations of 2001 should be
discarded, which is about 25% of the dataset. We choose not to do this.
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the catalogue. We decide to report statistics on price adjustment excluding product replacement.
The main NACE8 branches covered are Mining, Quarrying, Manufacturing Industry, Electricity, Gas
and Water Supply. Together these branches constitute the national accounts category Total Industry
Excluding Construction. Our data set can be disaggregated into 207 NACE 4-digit level branches, 97
NACE 3-digit level branches, and 27 NACE 2-digit level branches. The NACE classication also allows
a breakdown in six Main Industrial Groupings (MIG), classifying the goods at the NACE 3-digit level
according to their purpose of use. The classication distinguishes between consumer food, consumer
non-durables, consumer durables, intermediate goods, energy and capital goods. The classication is
somewhat di¤erent from the one used in the United States by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007)
(BLS). Intermediate goods and crude materials in the Stage of Processing (SoP) classication of the BLS
correspond roughly to intermediate goods and a part of energy in Eurostats classication. Finished
goods in the SoP classication correspond roughly to consumer food, consumer non-durables, consumer
durables, capital goods and a part of energy. To distinguish the term "intermediate goods" in economic
models from the term "intermediate goods" in the statistical classications of Eurostat (2002) and the
BLS (2007), we henceforth label intermediate goods in the Eurostat classication as "MIG-intermediate
goods" and in the BLS classication as "SoP-intermediate goods."
Between February 2002 and January 2005, the o¢ cial twelve-month PPI ination rate varied be-
tween -1.5% and 6%, while the average twelve-month ination rate was 1.5%. Note that throughout the
text we will refer to PPI ination as (aggregate) ination or aggregate price adjustment. The twelve-
month ination rate in our data set varied between -3.3% and 4.9%, while the average twelve-month
ination rate was 0.7%. The di¤erence between o¢ cial ination and the ination implied in our data
mainly comes from the export market. We conjecture that in the period our sample covers buoyant
export markets pushed up prices more than in the domestic market. The missing goods are spread over
di¤erent product categories, so we do not think that this di¤erence in average ination seriously a¤ects
our results. We also compare our main statistics with other countries that have somewhat higher ina-
8NACE stands for Statistical Classication of Economic Activities in the European Community.
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tion rates and do not nd signicant di¤erences. The correlation between the o¢ cial ination rate and
the ination rate in the data is 0.72. What is most important is that in our sample ination uctuates
considerably and average ination is low.
3 Facts about Producer Price Adjustment
3.1 Frequency and Size of Price Adjustment
Adjustment to shocks can occur through variation in the frequency as well as the size of price adjust-
ment. That is the reason why these two statistics are so often used in studies of price adjustment.
In Appendix A we show how we compute the frequency and size of price adjustment for the overall
dataset, across time, and across sectors. We obtain these statistics at the NACE 4-digit level, and
then aggregate to higher levels of aggregation using the PPI weights.9 As long as enough observations
are available, we analyze the data at the most disaggregate level. Exploiting the panel structure of
our dataset we here document the overall frequency and size of price adjustment, as well as variations
across time and sectors.
Overall Frequency and Size
Contrary to consumer prices we do not nd evidence for temporary price markdowns in producer prices.
Only 0.1% of the prices show the typical V-shaped pattern, where after a temporary price markdown the
price returns back to its previous level. This is one important qualitative di¤erence between consumer
and producer price adjustment. Therefore, we do not account for temporary price markdowns as
Nakamura and Steinsson (2007a) and Midrigan (2006) do for consumer prices. Kehoe and Midrigan
(2007) show that the presence of markdowns in consumer price data complicates modeling the price
setting decision. The absence of markdowns in producer prices attenuates this problem somewhat.
Each month on average 24% of prices adjust. This measure is a weighted average of the frequencies
originally computed for each of the branches of economic activity at the NACE 4-digit level. Our
9The NSI uses rm- and product-specic turnover to weight each price observation. As we have no access to these
weights, we assume that every observation has an equal weight at the NACE 4-digit level. We then use the o¢ cial PPI
weights to aggregate to higher levels of aggregation.
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average frequency of price adjustment fr is similar to the average frequency in other studies of micro
producer prices. Except for Italy all IPN studies nd an average frequency of price adjustment that is
higher than 20%. Nakamura and Steinsson (2007a) nd that 25% of nished goods prices adjust each
month. They exclude crude materials and SoP-intermediate goods, that have a share of 53% in our
dataset. We believe that including this part of the production chain contributes to the value added of
our paper, precisely to document price adjustment at the earlier stages of production.
Inverting the average frequency yields an average implied price duration of 4.2 months. The implied
duration is 10 months if we compute the weighted average of the implied durations at the NACE 4-digit
level. The di¤erence also applies for other countries and follows from Jensens inequality.10 Bils and
Klenow (2004) choose to calculate the weighted median of the inverse frequencies, which is 7 months for
our data. The inverse of the weighted median frequency gives the same result. Using survey evidence,
Aucremanne and Druant (2005) nd that the average price duration in the Belgian industry is 11.9
months, which is comparable to our average of the implied durations at the disaggregate level. In the
remainder of the paper we will continue to work with the average frequency of price adjustment fr.11
The average absolute size of price adjustment is 6%. This is 100 times the average monthly ination
rate of 0.06%. We see this as evidence for large idiosyncratic shocks as in Golosov and Lucas (2007).
The coexistence of upward and downward price adjustment corroborates this interpretation. The other
IPN studies nd an average size of adjustment ranging between 3.3% in Germany and 4.8% in Portugal.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2007a) nd a median size of 7.7% for nished goods.
<insert Figure 1 about here>
The average frequency of a price decrease is 11%, whereas a price increase is slightly more frequent
with 13%. So 54% of price changes are price increases. The average downward price adjustment is
10For more details concerning this issue we refer to Baharad and Eden (2004).
11 If we assume that prices can change at any moment, not just at monthly intervals, then the instantaneous probability
of a price change is   ln(1   fr). Bils and Klenow (2004) use the latter formula instead of a simple inversion of the
frequency to compute implied durations. If we use this formula instead of our simple inversion, we get an implied average
duration of 3.7 months, a weighted average implied duration of 9.4 months, and an implied median duration of 6.5 months.
The di¤erence between this approach and the one in the main text is always approximately 0.5 months.
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as large as the average upward price adjustment, so that we infer that there is limited evidence for
downward nominal rigidity. Downward nominal rigidity would imply that the distribution of price
changes is positively skewed. The skewness of the overall distribution of price changes in Figure 1 is
however negative with -0.36.12 Another way to compare asymmetry in upward and downward price
adjustment is to compare the distribution mass left from zero with the mass right from zero. Eyeballing
Figure 1 shows that if there is somewhat less frequent downward price adjustment, then this must come
from fewer small price decreases.
Frequency and Size Across Time
Figure 2 documents the frequency of price adjustment across time. The seasonality is very outspoken.
In January more than 40% of prices adjust compared to about 20% for the other months of the year.
We regress the monthly frequencies on a constant and 11 monthly dummies and indeed nd that only
the frequency in January signicantly di¤ers from the other months. For the sizes of price adjustment
in Figure 3 it is harder to tell whether there is a clear seasonal pattern. We regress the absolute value
of price changes on a constant and 11 monthly dummies, and again nd a signicant e¤ect in January.
On the one hand, a time-dependent model with more nominal price contracts adjusting in January
could reproduce this result. On the other hand, if changes in costs or demand are seasonal, then a
state-dependent model will also be able to reproduce this result. In Section 4.2 we analyze more in
depth how variation in the frequencies and sizes generates variation in aggregate ination.
<insert Figure 2 about here>
<insert Figure 3 about here>
Frequency and Size Across Sectors
Comparing the price adjustment frequencies in Table 1 across the six MIGs, we nd that the frequency
of price adjustment ranges from 50% for energy to 11% for consumer non-durables. Especially prices for
12We compute the weighted skewness of the distribution of price changes conditional on adjustment using the PPI
weights for each price change. See also Figure 1.
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food, intermediate goods and energy change often, whereas consumer non-durables, consumer durables
and capital goods change less often. Prices of less processed goods typically change more often. At the
more disaggregate level of the 97 NACE 3-digit branches of economic activity the standard deviation
of the frequencies is 20%. Table 1 shows that the average price adjustment ranges between 3% for
consumer durables and 7% for intermediate goods. At the NACE 3-digit branches of economic activity
the standard deviation is 4% for the absolute value of the sizes.
<insert Table 1 about here>
We nd that the correlation between the sectoral frequencies and sizes of price adjustment is not
signicantly di¤erent from zero. So for a given aggregate ination rate it is not so that some sectors
adjust relatively more through the frequency of price adjustment, and less through the size of price
adjustment. If there are sectoral di¤erences in competition or price adjustment costs, in a basic (s,S)-
type model of price adjustment à la Barro (1972) there would be a negative correlation between sizes
and frequencies. If there are sectoral di¤erences in the volatility of shocks we expect a positive or no
correlation.13 If there are at the same time di¤erences in competition, price adjustment costs and the
volatility of shocks it is hard to interpret the zero correlation. In Section 4.1 we assess more in depth
the importance of di¤erences in competition and cost structure for sectoral frequencies and sizes. In
Appendix B we report sectoral price adjustment statistics at the NACE 3-digit level.
A Comparison with Consumer Prices
Before comparing the adjustment of consumer and producer prices, it is worth noting that there are
two important dimensions along which the coverage of the CPI and PPI di¤ers. First, the CPI covers
goods and services, whereas the PPI only covers goods. Second, the stage of processing of the goods
13There are mainly three factors that can a¤ect the frequency/size of price adjustment in a menu cost model à la Barro
(1972). First, a larger adjustment cost implies that the frequency of price adjustment decreases, and the size of price
adjustment increases. Second, more competition increases the opportunity cost of non-adjustment, so that the frequency
of price adjustment increases, and the size of price adjustment decreases. Third, more volatile shocks to costs and demand
increase the frequency of price adjustment, and the size of price adjustment increases or can remain constant. The e¤ect
of more volatile shocks on the size of price adjustment will depend on the distribution of the shocks and their persistence.
It is unlikely that higher volatility will decrease the size of price adjustment in this model.
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di¤ers.14 Before a nished good can appear in the CPI it needs to be distributed. Distribution includes
wholesale, retail, marketing, advertisement, and transportation services. As in most industrialized
countries (Burstein et al., 2004) the distribution margin in Belgium accounts for about 40% of the
retail price of goods.
The choice of the level of aggregation to compare consumer and producer price adjustment depends
on the purpose of the comparison. For example, if we simply want to calibrate an economy with
consumer and producer prices and price setting à la Calvo, we should compare the entire baskets. For
Belgium Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004) nd that on average consumer goods adjust with a frequency
of 14% and a size of 8%.15 We nd that producer goods adjust with a frequency of 24% and a size of
6%.16 17 This goes against the conjecture of Bils and Klenow (2004), that the di¤erence between their
results and Blinder et al. (1998) may be due to producer prices adjusting less frequently. Nakamura
and Steinsson (2007a) compare consumer and producer price adjustment and conclude that there is no
signicant di¤erence. However, they only use nished producer goods and discard the more frequently
changing SoP-intermediate goods and crude materials.
If we want to understand what model can explain di¤erences in price adjustment arising from
progressing along the production chain, we should use comparable goods. We are able to match 82
pairs of goods covered both in the CPI and the PPI.18 Figures 4 and 5 illustrate that for consumer
goods the frequencies of price adjustment are on average lower, whereas the sizes of price adjustment
are larger. We also perform a t-test, Wilcoxon rank test, Kruskal-Wallis test comparing the mean and
median of the consumer and producer frequencies and sizes. All tests show that at the 1% signicance
14Another di¤erence is that the CPI also covers imported goods, whereas the PPI only covers goods produced at home.
15These numbers refer to the sample 1996-2003. In fact, Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004) report an average frequency
of price adjustment of 17% for the sample 1989-2001. They do not report an aggregate average size of price adjustment.
As our sample period is more recent, we prefer to use the more recent statistics provided by the authors.
16This result cannot be driven by an incomplete accounting for temporary markdowns in the CPI, because these
markdowns imply more frequent and larger price adjustment. Neither can the result for the frequencies be driven by the
fact that in the CPI data there is no indicator for the version of the product, whereas for producer price statistics we
decide to exclude product replacement. The di¤erent treatment of replacements in the CPI can only increase the estimate
of the frequency of consumer price adjustment, and thus narrow the gap between the two frequencies.
17Aucremanne and Druant (2005) nd that the frequency of price adjustment in the industrial sector is in between
other intermediate goods sectors such as construction and business services. Producer prices thus seem to represent well
price adjustment at the earlier stages of production.
18The list of goods can be obtained on request from the corresponding author.
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level the statistics are di¤erent, except for the median tests on the frequencies where the signicance
level is only 10%. So even if we use comparable goods we nd that for producer prices the frequencies of
price adjustment are higher, whereas the sizes are smaller. Except for Portugal all other IPN producer
price studies nd the same result.
<insert Figure 4 about here>
<insert Figure 5 about here>
Because of the larger share of labor-intensive services in the CPI we expect that consumer prices
change less frequently. Gordon (1990) also suggests that the stage of processing could have an e¤ect on
the frequency of price adjustment through the law of large numbers. At the end of the production chain
goods get more complicated so that input costs are more diversied and output prices need to change less
often. However, the arguments of more labor-intensive and better cost-diversied consumer goods have
di¢ culty in explaining a jointly larger size and lower frequency of consumer price adjustment. Theories
based on di¤erences in competition or price adjustment costs could account for this observation. The
fact that goods become more di¤erentiated at the end of the production chain, which generally lowers
competition, is supportive of this idea.
3.2 Some Additional Summary Statistics
The recent literature that documents price setting using micro data mostly focuses on the frequency
and size of price adjustment. However, we cannot calibrate some aspects of price setting unless we use
other moments of the data containing additional information. Some authors therefore use an extended
set of moments. We here report these statistics for our data and briey compare them.
Golosov and Lucas (2007) focus on the role of idiosyncratic shocks for price adjustment. They
use ve statistics computed by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2007) using US micro consumer prices. For a
detailed description of how to compute these statistics we refer to Klenow and Kryvtsov (2007). The
rst two statistics are the across time average and standard deviation of aggregate quarterly ination,
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which are 0.1% and 0.87%, as compared to 0.64% and 0.62% in the US. Their third statistic is the
average fraction of items adjusting, and is 24% compared to 21.9% in the US. The fourth statistic is
the weighted average price increase, and is 6% compared to 9.5% in the US. The fth statistic is the
average standard deviation of newly set prices and is a measure of how disperse newly set relative prices
are within a product category. The measure is based on the log deviation of a price from the product
category price index. For each item we compute the standard deviation of the log deviation across
months with price increases. Then we compute a weighted average of these standard deviations. We
calculate this statistic at the NACE 4-digit level, and is 0.071 compared to 0.087 in the US.
Midrigan (2006) reports the mean, standard deviation and kurtosis of the price change distribution
conditional on adjustment. We respectively nd 0.00%, 9.58%, and 16.41, compared to 1.5%, 10.4% and
5.4 in the Dominicks Finer Foods scanner dataset.19 The high kurtosis reects the overrepresentation
of small price changes compared to a normal distribution. This is also very clear in Figure 1, comparing
the histogram of price changes with the corresponding histogram of the normal distribution. Midrigan
(2006) also measures the share of small price changes by the share of absolute price changes that are
smaller than half the average price change. This is 54% of the price changes in our data, compared
to 35% in the Dominicks Finer Foods scanner dataset. Although Midrigan looks at a narrow set of
consumer prices, this indicates that small price changes are more important for producer prices. The
assumption of a multi-product retailer can account for this large share of small price changes. To assess
the plausibility of the multi-product retailer assumption we unfortunately do not have information on
how many products each rm in our dataset sells.
We compute the Fisher and Konieczny (2000) index that measures the degree of synchronization
in price adjustment across items. The index ranges from 0 to 1, corresponding respectively to perfect
staggering and perfect synchronization.20 We do this at the 4-, 3-, and 2-digit level, and compute a
19Midrigan (2006) also computes the same statistics for ACNielsen data.
20The synchronization ratio in product category j is dened as: FKj =
s
1
 1
P
t=2
(frjt frj)2
frj(1 frj)
.  is the number of time
periods.
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weighted average. We get a value of respectively 0.46, 0.44, and 0.37, indicating that price adjustment
is more synchronized at a more disaggregate level. This is consistent with Dhyne and Konieczny (2007)
for consumer prices.
These additional moments indicate that producer price adjustment does not di¤er much qualitatively
from consumer price adjustment, except that quantitatively there might be some di¤erence in the
kurtosis of the price change distribution.
4 What Determines Price Adjustment?
First, we ask what explains the sectoral heterogeneity in frequencies and sizes of price adjustment.
Second, we ask to what extent time variation in the frequency vs. time variation in the size of price
adjustment explain (in an accounting sense) aggregate ination uctuations.
4.1 Sectoral Fluctuations
In Section 3.1 we documented that the frequencies and sizes of price adjustment are heterogeneous
across sectors. We here run a number of reduced form regressions linking the sectoral frequencies/sizes
of price adjustment at the NACE 3-digit level to proxies for the degree of competition and the cost
structure suggested by economic theory. We distinguish between the overall, downward and upward
frequency/size of price adjustment. The proxies for the determinants are either calculated on the basis
of the Belgian input-output tables, an ad hoc survey on price setting for Belgium by Aucremanne and
Druant (2005), or the rmsannual balance sheets. We provide the sources and a detailed description in
Appendix A. First, we test the importance of the degree of competition. Sectors with less competition
have a less curved prot function, so that the extent to which they deviate from their optimal price has
less impact on their prots. In a basic (s,S)-type model à la Barro (1972) we expect them to adjust their
price less frequently and with a larger size. Second, we test the importance of the cost structure. In a
basic (s, S)-type model higher volatility of the optimal price raises the frequency of price adjustment,
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whereas the size increases or remains stable.
<insert Table 2 about here>
Competition
We measure the degree of competition in two ways. First, we use a standard sectoral four-rm con-
centration ratio (C4) calculated using the annual balance sheets of rms. This measure is widely used,
but it is also known to be problematic in measuring competition. Concentration ratios have been
criticized as there are examples of highly concentrated industries in which competition is intense (e.g.
telecommunications), and industries with a large number of competitors in which competition is low
(e.g. bars and restaurants). Our second and potentially better proxy (MARKUP) comes from Aucre-
manne and Druant (2005). It is the share of rms in a sector that states that setting the price according
to their costs and to a self-determined prot margin is an "important" or "very important" practice.
We nd no relation between the concentration ratio and the frequency and size of price adjustment.
Regressing the frequencies and sizes on the second proxy we nd that higher market power decreases
the frequency of price adjustment. However, the result is not robust to including measures for the cost
structure. Contrary to what theory would predict the size of price adjustment is also not related to
this second proxy. We conclude that if there is a link between the degree of competition and sectoral
price adjustment it appears to be rather weak.
Cost Structure
To proxy the cost structure of the di¤erent sectors, we use the share of labor costs (LABOR) and energy
inputs (ENERGY) in total costs.21 We regress the frequency/size of price adjustment on these proxies,
accounting for di¤erences in the degree of competition. The share of labor costs decreases the frequency
of price adjustment, whereas the share of energy inputs increases the frequency of price adjustment.
This is intuitive as the price of energy (labor) inputs changes both frequently (infrequently) and with
a large (small) amount. Only in one case is the size of price adjustment positively related to energy. In
21Other important inputs in the production are business services, capital costs and non-energy intermediate inputs.
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the other cases the size of price adjustment is not related to any of the cost structure proxies. This is
in line with theory. All ndings hold for upward as well as downward price adjustment. We interpret
the strong relation between the cost structure and the frequencies of price adjustment as reecting the
importance of idiosyncratic shocks in explaining sectoral frequencies.
4.2 Aggregate Fluctuations
Di¤erent models have di¤erent implications about whether aggregate ination occurs through variation
in size (dp) or frequency (fr) of price adjustment. A purely time-dependent model implies adjustment
only through variation in the size of price adjustment. A large class of state-dependent pricing models
mainly relies on variation in the frequency of price adjustment to adjust aggregate prices. Other state-
dependent models such as the one in Golosov and Lucas (2007) rely on variation in both the size
and frequency. In this Section we document through which margin aggregate price adjustment comes
about. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2007) show that ination t can be written as the weighted sum of the
percentage log di¤erence of current prices Pit and previous prices Pit 1, using PPI weights wit. The
indicator function I is equal to 1 if the current price is di¤erent from the previous price, and 0 otherwise.
This weighted sum is also equal to the share of prices that are changing frt times the average price
change dpt. Equation (1) is the result of a rst-order Taylor-series expansion of frtdpt around frt and
dpt.
t =
nX
i=1
wit (lnPit   lnPit 1) =
nX
i=1
witIit| {z }
frt
P
iwit (lnPit   lnPit 1)
nX
i=1
witIit| {z }
dpt
= frtdpt
t   frtdpt = frt
 
dpt   dpt
| {z }
Si ze
+ dpt
 
frt   frt
| {z }
Frequency
(1)
+
 
frt   frt
  
dpt   dpt
| {z }
Mixed
<insert Figure 6 about here>
In Figure 6 we show the contribution to demeaned ination t frtdpt of the three terms in equation (1).
Mainly variation in the size of price adjustment contributes to ination. To determine the contribution
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to the variation in ination, in Table 3 we regress ination on dpt and frt. We nd that 80% of the
variance is explained by this regression and that only dpt has a signicant coe¢ cient. Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2007) compute the contribution of the variance of an intensive and an extensive margin to
the variance of ination. Their extensive margin is a composite of the variance of the frequencies,
the covariance of frequencies and sizes, and higher order terms.22 In this way in our data 36% of
the variance is accounted for by the intensive margin, whereas 64% is accounted for by the extensive
margin. The variance and covariance term in their extensive margin is always close to zero, whereas
the higher order terms contribute largely due to the seasonality in January. When we exclude January
we get that 85% is accounted for by the intensive margin. The higher order terms represent 15%.
<insert Table 3 about here>
In a similar way we can decompose ination distinguishing between upward and downward price
adjustment.
t = fr
+
t dp
+
t + fr
 
t dp
 
t
t   fr+t dp+t   fr t dp t = fr+t

dp+t   dp+t

| {z }
Si ze+
+ fr t

dp t   dp t

| {z }
Si ze 
(2)
+dp+t

fr+t   fr+t

| {z }
Frequency+
+ dp t

fr t   fr t

| {z }
Frequency 
+

fr+t   fr+t

dp+t   dp+t

| {z }
Mixed+
+

fr t   fr t

dp t   dp t

| {z }
Mixed 
If we compute the contribution of the six terms in equation (2), we get in Figure 7 that variation in the
size and frequency of price adjustment account for a more or less equal share in ination variation. To
determine the contribution to variation in ination, we regress ination on the upward and downward
sizes/frequencies and get that each of them is important in explaining the variation in ination. So
explicitly accounting for upward and downward price adjustment, we nd that there is a role for both
22From equation (1) they get:
var (t) = var (dpt) fr
2| {z }
Intensive margin
+ var (frt) dp
2
+ 2frdpcov (frt; dpt) + higher order terms| {z }
Extensive m arg in
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variation in the size and frequency of price adjustment.
<insert Figure 7 about here>
The di¤erence with the previous result comes from the o¤setting movements in the frequency of price
increases and decreases. Whereas apart from large seasonal uctuations frt remains fairly constant,
dpt varies a lot. Note that dpt is equal to
fr+t dp
+
t +fr
 
t dp
 
t
frt
. The variation in dpt does not just come from
variation in dp t and dp
+
t , but also from o¤setting variation in fr
+
t and fr
 
t . This is consistent with
the ndings of Klenow and Kryvtsov (2007), Nakamura and Steinsson (2007a), and Gagnon (2007) for
US and Mexican consumer prices.
5 Conclusion
We nd that on average 24% of producer prices adjust each month with an average increase/decrease
of 6%. Consumer prices only adjust with an average frequency of 14%, but a size of 8%. Even
for a selection of 82 comparable goods, we still nd more frequent but smaller-sized producer price
adjustment. Di¤erences in the degree of competition or price adjustment costs seem necessary to
explain the di¤erence in consumer and producer price adjustment. Across (sub)-sectors within the
producer sector the frequencies and sizes of price adjustment are heterogeneous. The heterogeneity in
the frequencies is to a large extent driven by heterogeneity in the cost structure, reecting a di¤erent
exposure to idiosyncratic shocks. In the presence of large upward and downward idiosyncratic shocks,
aggregate ination in our low-ination environment comes to a large extent from variation in the share
of upward and downward price adjustment.
In sum, we nd that a lot of qualitative facts on producer price adjustment coincide with earlier
evidence on consumer prices. However, the quantitative di¤erences should be important enough not to
be neglected when calibrating models with intermediate goods.
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Appendix A: Data Issues
Construction Basic Statistics
We dene the following binary variables for a price Pijt of a product in branch of economic activity j
sold by rm i at time t at the NACE 4-digit level:
DENijt =
1 if Pijt and Pijt 1 are observed
0 if Pijt exists but not Pijt 1
; NUMijt =
1 if Pijt 6= Pijt 1
0 otherwise
;
NUMUPijt =
1 if Pijt > Pijt 1
0 otherwise
; NUMDOWNijt =
1 if Pijt < Pijt 1
0 otherwise
.
One can calculate the frequency and size of price adjustment at time t for branch of economic
activity j as:
Average Frequency of price adjustment:
frjt =
njX
i=1
NUMijt
njX
i=1
DENijt
; fr+jt =
njX
i=1
NUMUPijt
njX
i=1
DENijt
; fr jt =
njX
i=1
NUMDOWNijt
njX
i=1
DENijt
.
Average size of price adjustment:
dpjt =
njX
i=1
(lnPijt lnPijt 1)
njX
i=1
NUMijt
; dp+jt =
njX
i=1
(lnPijt lnPijt 1)
njX
i=1
NUMUPijt
; dp jt =
njX
i=1
((lnPijt lnPijt 1))
njX
i=1
NUMDOWNijt
.
nj is the number of rms selling a product belonging to branch of economic activity j. The branch
of economic activity statistics can subsequently be aggregated to statistics at the NACE 3-digit, NACE
2-digit or the entire Industry level using the PPI weights. All these statistics can also be aggre-
gated/averaged across time t and/or branches of economic activity j. When we drop a time t or branch
of economic activity j subscript this means that the statistic is the result of an aggregation over time
or branches of economic activity. For the total Industry, the notation for the frequency of price adjust-
ment, the frequency of upward price adjustment, the frequency of downward price adjustment, the size
of price adjustment, the absolute size of price adjustment, the downward size of price adjustment and
the upward size of price adjustment is respectively as follows: fr, fr+, fr , dp, jdpj, dp , dp+.
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Additional Data
Description Source
MARKUP
Share of rms stating that setting
price fully according to costs and
self-determined margin is important
or very importantto set price of
their main product.
Aucremanne and Druant (2004)
C4
Average 02-05 four-rm-
concentration ratio.
NBB Balance Sheet O¢ ce
LABOR Share of labor costs in total costs. Input/output tables; NSI & NBB
ENERGY
Share of energy intermediate inputs
in total costs.
Input/output tables; NSI & NBB
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Monthly Size and Frequency of Price Adjustment
Overall adjustment Up. adjustment Down. adjustment
fr jdpj fr+ dp+ fr  jdp j
Consumer food 20% 5% 11% 5% 9% 5%
Consumer non-durables 11% 4% 6% 4% 5% 5%
Consumer durables 14% 3% 8% 3% 6% 3%
MIG-Intermediate goods 28% 7% 15% 7% 14% 6%
Energy 50% 3% 33% 3% 17% 4%
Capital goods 13% 6% 7% 5% 6% 7%
Total 24% 6% 13% 6% 11% 6%
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Table 3: Determinants of Aggregate Ination
t
c 0:00
(0:00)
0:00
(0:00)
0:00
(0:00)
 0:01
(0:00)
 0:01
(0:00)
 0:00
(0:00)
0:01
(0:00)
 0:00
(0:00)
frt 0:00
(0:01)
- 0:01
(0:01)
- - - - -
dpt - 0:36
(0:03)
 0:37
(0:03)
 - - - - -
fr+t - - - 0:06
(0:02)
 - - - 0:08
(0:01)

fr t - - - -  0:06
(0:02)
 - -  0:08
(0:01)

dp+t - - - - - 0:09
(0:06)
- 0:20
(0:03)

dp t - - - - - - 0:16
(0:06)
 0:21
(0:03)

R2 0:00 0:80 0:81 0:26 0:18 0:04 0:16 0:86
Note: We regress ination on di¤erent sets of determinants. ***/**/* indicate that the coe¢ cient
estimate is signicant at the 1%/5%/10% level. Standard errors are reported in brackets. The sample
covers 2001:2-2005:1.
Figure 1: Distribution Non-Zero Price Changes
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Note: The line is the histogram for the normal distri-
bution with the same mean and variance as the em-
pirical histogram.
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Figure 2: Frequency of Price Adjustment Across Time
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Figure 3: Size of Price Adjustment Across Time
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Figure 4: Frequency of Price Adjustment Across Goods
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Note: We link the frequencies of price adjustment of
82 producer and consumer items.
Figure 5: Size of Price Adjustment Across Goods
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Note: We link the absolute sizes of price adjustment
of 82 producer and consumer items.
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Figure 6: Ination Decomposition I
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Note: Decomposition of ination in variation in the
size and frequency of price adjustment as in equation
(1). The contribution is computed as the ratio of the
absolute value of a term over the sum of the absolute
values of the three terms.
Figure 7: Ination Decomposition II
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Note: Decomposition of ination in variation in the
size and frequency of price adjustment as in equation
(2). The contribution is computed as the ratio of the
absolute value of a term over the sum of the absolute
values of the six terms.
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We estimate the curvature of the demand curve for a wide range of products. We use an extension
of Deaton and Muellbauers Almost Ideal Demand System and scanner data from a large euro area
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1 Introduction
A large literature documents the persistent e¤ects of monetary policy on real output and ination
(Christiano et al., 1999, 2005; Peersman, 2004). To match this persistence micro-founded models with
sticky prices were developed. A rst approach was to introduce frictions to nominal price adjustment
(e.g. Taylor, 1980; Calvo, 1983; Mankiw, 1985). However, as shown by several authors, the real e¤ects
of nominal frictions do not last much longer than the average duration of a price (Chari et al., 2000;
Bergin and Feenstra, 2000). Taking into account recent microeconomic evidence that the mean price
duration lies between 1.8 and 4 quarters for the United States (Bils and Klenow, 2004; Nakamura and
Steinsson, 2007), and between 4 to 5 quarters for the euro area (Dhyne et al., 2006), nominal frictions
alone fail to generate the persistence observed in the data.
The failure of nominal frictions alone to generate persistence has led to the development of models
that combine nominal and so-called real price rigidities (Ball and Romer, 1990). Real rigidities refer to
strategic complementarity in the price setting decision of rms. A rm is more reluctant to adjust its
price in response to changes in the state of the economy the less other rms adjust their prices. Dif-
ferent frictions can generate this strategic complementarity. One option is the roundabout production
structure of Basu (1995). Real price rigidity follows from the assumption that rms use the output of
all other rms as materials in their own production (Bergin and Feenstra, 2000). A second option is
to model rm-specic production factors.1 In this case the marginal cost is a negative function of the
relative price, which again dampens the incentive to change prices.
An alternative, and recently very popular, way to introduce strategic complementarity is the prefer-
ence specication of Kimball (1995).2 In contrast to the traditional Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator,
Kimball (1995) no longer assumes a constant elasticity of substitution in demand. The price elasticity
of demand becomes a function of the relative price. A key concept is the so-called curvature of the
1E.g. Galí and Gertler, 1999; Sbordone, 2002; Woodford, 2003; Altig et al., 2005; Burstein and Hellwig, 2007.
2See e.g. Bergin and Feenstra (2000), Coenen, Levin and Christo¤el (2006), Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), Smets
and Wouters (2007), Dotsey and King (2005), Dotsey, King and Wolman (2006), Klenow and Willis (2006).
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demand curve, which measures the price elasticity of the price elasticity. When the curvature is posi-
tive, Kimballs preferences generate a concave or smoothed "kinked" demand curve in a log price/log
quantity framework. A price above the level of the rms competitors increases the elasticity of demand
for its product, so that the rm increasingly loses prots from relative price increases. Conversely, a
price below the level of the rms competitors reduces the elasticity of demand for its product, so that
the rm again increasingly loses prots from relative price decreases. In this way the combination of
small costs to nominal price adjustment and a concave demand curve generates slow adjustment to
changes in the state of the economy.
Despite its attractiveness, the literature su¤ers from a lack of empirical evidence on the curvature
of a typical demand curve. In Table 1 we report the parameter values for the price elasticity of demand
and for the curvature as calibrated or estimated in recent models using macroeconomic data. Values
for the (positive) price elasticity range from 3 to 20. Values for the curvature range from less than 2 to
more than 400.
Table 1: Price Elasticity and Curvature of Demand in the Literature
Price Elasticity Curvature
Kimball (1995) 11 471(a)
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) 10 385(a)
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) 11 10; 33
Coenen, Levin and Christo¤el (2006) 5  20 10; 33
Smets and Wouters (2007) 3 10
Klenow and Willis (2006) 5 10
Woodford (2005) 7:67 6:67(a)
Bergin and Feenstra (2000) 3 1:33(a)
Note: Curvature is dened as the elasticity of the price elasticity of demand with
respect to the relative price at steady state. Several authors characterize curvature
di¤erently. In Appendix 1 we derive the relationships between alternative deni-
tions of curvature. The numbers indicated with (a) have been computed using these
relationships. It is sometimes argued that Kimball (1995) would have imposed a cur-
vature equal to 33 (see Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2004; Coenen, Levin and Christo¤el,
2006). Our calculations show however that Kimballs curvature must be much larger.
Our contribution in this paper is twofold. First, we estimate the curvature of the demand curve.
To do this, we use scanner data on both prices and quantities from a large euro area supermarket
chain. The dataset contains information about prices and quantities sold of about 15,000 items in
3
2002-2005.3 As is typical for studies with micro data, we nd wide variation in the estimated curvature
of demand among items/product categories. We observe both items with a convex and a concave
demand curve. This result would ideally be matched with a model with heterogeneous rms that can
match the entire distribution of curvatures. Our results also support the introduction of a kinked
(concave) demand curve in a representative rm economy, but the median degree of curvature is much
lower than currently calibrated. This nding is consistent with Klenow and Willis (2006) who nd
that the joint assumption of realistic idiosyncratic shocks and a curvature of 10 is not compatible with
observed nominal and relative price changes in US data.
Second, we link the estimates for the curvature of the demand curve to statistics on nominal price
adjustment. In case strategic complementarity a¤ects price setting these should be correlated. We nd
no clear correlation between the estimated curvature and the observed size or frequency of nominal price
adjustment in our data. The fact that our data stems from a multi-product retailer may explain this
lack of correlation. Midrigan (2006) argues that the item-specic frequency and size of price adjustment
in a multi-product rm are also a function of the shocks and price adjustment frictions of the entire
product category to which the item belongs. This could explain why the relation between item-specic
statistics of price adjustment and the estimated elasticities and curvatures is disturbed in our data.
Section 2 describes the dataset in detail. Section 3 of the paper presents a more rigorous econometric
analysis of price elasticities and curvature parameters for individual items. To that end we extend the
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Basic Facts about the Data
2.1 Description of Dataset
We use scanner data for a sample of six outlets of an anonymous large euro area supermarket chain.
This retailer carries a very broad assortment of about 15,000 di¤erent items (stockkeeping units). The
products in the total dataset correspond to approximately 40% of the euro area CPI. The data that
3Note that the items that are sold by our retailer can be di¤erently packaged goods of the same brand. All items
and/or brands in turn belong to a particular product category (e.g. potatoes, detergent).
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we use in this paper are prices and total quantities sold per outlet of 2274 individual items belonging
to 58 randomly selected product categories. Appendix 2 describes these categories and the number
of items in each product category. The time span of our data runs from January 2002 to April 2005.
Observations are bi-weekly. Prices are constant during each period of two weeks. They are the same
in each of the six outlets. The quantities are the number of packages of an item that are sold during a
time period.
2.2 Nominal Price Adjustment
The nominal price friction in our dataset is that prices are predetermined for periods of at least two
weeks. If they are changed at the beginning of a period of two weeks, they are not changed again before
the beginning of the next period of two weeks, irrespective of demand. A second characteristic of our
data is the high frequency of temporary price markdowns. We dene the latter as any sequence of
three, two or one price(s) that is below both the most left adjacent price and the most right adjacent
price.4 The median item is marked down for 8% of the time, whereas 27% of the median items output
is sold at times of price markdowns. In line with the previous, price markdowns are valid for an entire
period, and not just for a few days.
Using the prices in the dataset, we can estimate the size of price adjustment, the frequency of price
adjustment and median price duration as has been done in Bils and Klenow (2004) and Dhyne et al.
(2006). Table 2 contains these statistics. The total number of items involved is 2274. Note that due to
entry or exit we do not observe data for all items in all periods. We calculate price adjustment statistics
including and excluding temporary price markdowns. When an observed price is a markdown price, we
replace it by the last observed regular price (see also Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2005). We illustrate our
procedure in Appendix 3.
Conditional on price changes taking place and including markdowns, we see in Table 2 that 25% of
the items have an average absolute price change of less than 5%. At the other end, 25% have an average
4This denition puts us somewhere in between Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) and Midrigan (2006).
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absolute price change of more than 17%. The median item has an average absolute price change of 9%.
Filtering out markdowns, the latter falls to 5%. As to price duration, the median items price lasts 0.9
quarters when we include markdown periods. It lasts 6.6 quarters excluding markdown periods. Price
duration in our data is only slightly longer than is typically observed in the US and the euro area (Bils
and Klenow, 2004; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2007; Dhyne et al., 2006).
Table 2: Nominal Price Adjustment Statistics
Incl. markdowns Excl. markdowns
Percentile 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
Average Absolute Size 5% 9% 17% 3% 5% 8%
Implied Median Price Duration (quarters) 0.4 0.9 2.8 2.4 6.6 1
Note: The statistics reported in this table are based on bi-weekly price data for 2274 items
belonging to 58 product categories from January 2002 to April 2005. The data show the average
absolute percentage price change (conditional on a price change taking place) and the median
price duration of the items at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile, ordered from low to high.
2.3 Real Price and Quantity Adjustment
Table 3 presents summary statistics on real (relative) price and quantity changes over the six outlets in
our dataset. All changes are again in comparison with the previous period of two weeks. The nominal
price pi of individual item i is common across the outlets. All the other data are di¤erent per outlet.
Real (relative) item prices pi=P  have been calculated by deating the nominal price of item i by the
outlet-specic Stone price index P  for the product category to which the item belongs.5 The Stone
price index is computed as
lnP  =
NX
i=1
si ln pi (1)
with N the number of items in the product category to which i belongs, si =
piqi
X the outlet-specic
share of item i in total nominal expenditures X on the product category, qi the total quantity of item i
sold at the outlet and X =
NX
i=1
piqi. Total outlet-specic real expenditures Q on the product category
have been obtained as Q = X=P . Relative quantities qi=Q show much higher and much more variable
percentage changes than relative prices. Including markdowns, the average absolute percentage change
5As an alternative to the Stone index we have also worked with the Fisher index. The results based on this price index
are available upon request. They conrm our main ndings here.
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in relative quantity equals 59% for the median item, with a standard deviation of 77%. The average
absolute percentage relative price change for the median item equals only 9%, with a standard deviation
of 12%.
Table 3: Real Price and Quantity Adjustment
Including markdowns Excl. markdowns
Percentile 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
Average absolute  ln(pi=P ) 6% 9% 15% 5% 8% 15%
Average absolute  ln(qi=Q) 39% 59% 80% 38% 59% 79%
Standard Deviation  ln(pi=P ) 7% 12% 21% 7% 12% 21%
Standard Deviation  ln(qi=Q) 52% 77% 102% 51% 77% 101%
Note: The statistics reported in this table are based on changes in bi-weekly data for 2274
items belonging to 58 product categories in six outlets. Individual nominal item prices (pi)
are common across the outlets, all the other data (P ; qi; Q) can be di¤erent per outlet.
For the statistical analysis we have excluded items that are mentioned in the supermarkets
circular. For a proper interpretation, note that the median item can be di¤erent in each
row of this table.
3 How Large is the Curvature?
There exist a number of mechanisms that can give rise to a concave demand curve. First, there can be
loss aversion of consumers relative to a price reference point (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Heidhues
and Köszegi, 2008). When a rms price is higher than this reference point consumers perceive a loss,
and will cut their consumption additionally due to loss aversion. Second, there can be customer search
as in Okun (1981) and Bénabou (1988). In this model there is a long term relationship between the
rm and the customer. If the rm increases its price, existing customers will feel being treated unfairly
and leave, whereas when the rm decreases its price, existing customers stay, but do not buy more.
This creates and asymmetric reaction to price increases versus price decreases. Third, the asymmetry
in the demand curve can also simply come from preferences as assume Kimball (1995) and Dotsey and
King (2005). All models have in common that they can generate a concave demand curve, but to nd
out which model could generate this concavity is beyond the scope of this paper. We here focus on the
empirical question of how sensitive is the demand elasticity to changes in the relative price. To produce
real price rigidity it is su¢ cient to know to what extent the demand elasticity is sensitive to changes
in the relative price.
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We estimate the price elasticity and the curvature of demand for a broad range of goods in our
European scanner dataset. We extend the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) developed by Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980) to give room for the behavioral mechanisms described above. Our "behavioral"
AIDS model allows for a more general curvature, which is necessary to answer our research question.
The model still has the original AIDS nested as a special case. For several reasons we believe the AIDS
is the most appropriate for our purposes: (i) it is exible with respect to estimating own- and cross-price
elasticities; (ii) it is simple, transparent and easy to estimate, allowing us to deal with a large number of
product categories; (iii) it is most appropriate in a setup like ours where consumers may buy di¤erent
items of given product categories; (iv) it is not necessary to specify the characteristics of all goods, and
use these in the regressions. The latter three characteristics particularly distinguish the AIDS from
alternative approaches like the mixed logit model used by Berry et al. (1995). Their demand model is
based on a discrete-choice assumption under which consumers purchase at most one unit of one item
of the di¤erentiated product. This assumption is appropriate for large purchases such as cars. In a
context where consumers might purchase several items, it may be less suitable. Moreover, to estimate
Berry et al. (1995)s mixed logit model, the characteristics of all goods/items must be specied. In the
case of cars this is a much easier task to do than for instance for cement or spaghetti. Computational
requirements of their methodology are also very demanding.
We follow the approach of Broda and Weinstein (2006) to cover as many goods as possible in order
to get a reliable estimate for the aggregate curvature. In Section 3.1 we rst describe our extension of
the AIDS model. Section 3.2 discusses our econometric setup and identication and estimation. Section
3.3 presents the results. In Section 3.4 we discuss their robustness.
3.1 Model
Our extension of Deaton and Muellbauers AIDS model is specied in expenditure share form as
si = i +
NX
j=1
ij ln pj + i ln

X
P

+
NX
j=1
ij

ln(
pj
P
)
2
(2)
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for i = 1; :::; N . In this equation X is total nominal expenditure on the product category of N items
being analyzed (e.g. detergents), P is the price index for this product category, pj is the price of the
jth item within the product category and si is the share of total expenditures allocated to item i (i.e.
si = piqi=X). Deaton and Muellbauer dene the price index P as
lnP = 0 +
NX
j=1
j ln pj +
1
2
NX
j=1
NX
i=1
ij ln pi ln pj (3)
Our extension of the model concerns the last term at the right hand side of Equation (2). The
original AIDS model has ij = 0. Although this model is generally recognized to be exible, it is not
exible enough for our purpose. As we demonstrate below, the curvature parameter is not free in the
original AIDS model. It is a restrictive function of the price elasticity, implying that in the original
AIDS model it would not be possible to obtain a convex demand curve.
The implication of this is that relative price e¤ects on the elasticity of demand should be accounted
for in demand analysis. The added term
NX
j=1
ij
 
ln(
pj
P )
2 in Equation (2) allows us to capture these
additional e¤ects. Provided that standard adding up (
NX
i=1
i = 1,
NX
i=1
ij = 0,
NX
i=1
i = 0,
NX
i=1
ij = 0),
homogeneity (
NX
j=1
ij = 0) and symmetry (ij = ji) restrictions hold, our extended equation is a valid
representation of preferences. The denition of the (positive) uncompensated own price elasticity of
demand for good i is:
"i =  @ ln qi
@ ln pi
= 1  @ ln si
@ ln pi
(4)
where qi = siX=pi. Applied to our behavioral AIDS model, "i can then be derived from Equation (2)
as
"i(B AIDS) = 1 
1
si
0@ii   i @ lnP@ ln pi + 2ii ln(piP )  2
NX
j=1
ij ln(
pj
P
)
@ lnP
@ ln pi
1A (5)
where we hold total nominal expenditure on the product category X as well as all other prices pj (j 6= i)
constant. In the AIDS model the correct expression for the elasticity of the group price P with respect
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to pi is
@ lnP
@ ln pi
= i +
NX
j=1
ij ln pj (6)
However, since using the price index from Equation (3) often raises empirical di¢ culties (see e.g. Buse,
1994), researchers commonly use Stones geometric price index P , given by (1). The model is then
called the "linear approximate AIDS" (LA/AIDS). To obtain the own price elasticity for the LA/AIDS
model, one has to start from Stones P  and derive
@ lnP 
@ ln pi
= si +
NX
j=1
sj ln pj
@ ln sj
@ ln pi
(7)
Green and Alston (1990) and Buse (1994) discuss several approaches to computing the LA/AIDS price
elasticities depending on the assumptions made with regard to @ ln sj@ ln pi and therefore
@ lnP 
@ ln pi
. A common
approach is to assume @ ln sj@ ln pi = 0, such that
@ lnP 
@ ln pi
= si. Monte Carlo simulations by Alston et al. (1994)
and Buse (1994) reveal that this approximation is superior to many others (e.g. smaller estimation
bias). In our empirical work we will also use Stones price index and this approximation. The (positive)
uncompensated own price elasticity implied by this approach then is
"i(LA=B AIDS) = 1 
ii
si
+ i  
2ii ln(
pi
P  )
si
+ 2
NX
j=1
ij ln(
pj
P 
) (8)
Equation (8) incorporates several channels for the relative price of an item to a¤ect the price
elasticity of demand. The contribution of our behavioral extension of the AIDS model is obvious from
the presence of ii in this equation. Since si is typically far below 1, observing ii < 0 will most likely
imply a concave demand curve, with "i rising in the relative price
pi
P  . When ii > 0, it is more likely
to nd convexity in the demand curve.
At steady state, for all relative prices equal to 1, the price elasticity becomes
"i(LA=B AIDS)(1) = 1 
ii
si
+ i (9)
Finally, starting from Equation (8) we show in Appendix 4 that the implied curvature of the demand
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function at steady state is
i(LA=B AIDS) =
@ ln "i
@ ln pi
(10)
=
1
"i
0@("i   1) ("i   1  i)  2ii(1  si)si + 2(ii   si
NX
j=1
ij)
1A (11)
Also in this equation the role of ii is clear. For given price elasticity, the lower ii, the higher the
estimated curvature.
A simple comparison of the above results with the price elasticity and the curvature in the basic
LA/AIDS model underscores the importance of our extension. Putting ii = ij = 0, one can derive
for the basic LA/AIDS model that
"i(LA=AIDS) = 1 
ii
si
+ i (12)
i(LA=AIDS) =
("i   1)("i   1  i)
"i
(13)
With i mostly close to zero (and zero on average) the curvature then becomes a restrictive and rising
function of the price elasticity, at least for "i > 1. Moreover, positive price elasticities "i almost
unavoidably imply positive curvatures, which excludes convex demand curves. In light of our ndings
in Table 4 this is too restrictive.
3.2 Identication/Estimation
The sample that we use for estimation contains data for 28 product categories sold in each of the six
outlets (supermarkets). The time frequency is a period of two weeks, with the time series running from
the rst bi-week of 2002 until the 8th bi-week of 2005. The selection of the 28 categories, coming from
58 in Section 2, is driven by data requirements and motivated in Appendix 2.
To keep estimation manageable we include ve items per product category. Four of these items
have been selected on the basis of clear criteria to improve data quality and make estimation possible.
The fth item is called "other". It is constructed as a weighted average of all other items. We include
"other" to fully capture substitution possibilities for the four main items. Specifying "other" also
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enables us to deal with entry and exit of individual items during the sample period.6 We discuss the
selection of the four items and the construction of "other" in Appendix 2 as well. For each item i within
a product category the basic empirical demand specication is:
simt = im +
5X
j=1
ij ln pjt + i ln

Xmt
P mt

+
5X
j=1
ij

ln(
pjt
P mt
)
2
+
5X
j=1
'ijCjt + it + "imt
i = 1; ::::; 5 m = 1; ::::; 6 t = 1; ::::; 86 (14)
where simt is the share of item i in total product category expenditure at outlet m and time t, Xmt is
overall product category expenditure at outlet m and time t, P mt is Stones price index for the category
at outlet m and pjt is the price of the jth item in the category. As we mentioned before, individual item
prices are equal across outlets and predetermined. They are not changed during the period. This is an
important characteristic of our data, which strongly facilitates identication of the demand curve (cf.
infra). Furthermore, im captures item specic and outlet specic xed e¤ects.7 Finally, we include
dummies to capture demand shocks with respect to item i at time t which are common across outlets.
Circular dummies Cjt are equal to 1 when an item j in the product category to which i belongs, is
mentioned in the supermarkets circular. The circular is common to all outlets. For each item we also
include three holiday dummies it for New Year, Easter and Christmas. These dummies should capture
shifts in market share from one item to another during the respective periods.
Our estimation method is SUR. The assumption underlying this choice is that prices pit are un-
correlated with the error term "imt. For at least two reasons we believe this assumption is justied.
Problems to identify the demand curve, as discussed by e.g. Hausman et al. (1994), Hausman (1997)
and Menezes-Filho (2005), should therefore not exist. First, since our retailer sets prices in advance
and does not change them to equilibrate supply and demand in a given period, prices can be considered
predetermined with respect to Equation (14). Second, prices are equal in all six outlets. We assume
6The specication of "other" may also come at a cost. Including "other" imposes a number of restrictions on the
regression. In Section 3.4. we briey reconsider this issue.
7To control for item specic xed e¤ects, note that we have also de-meaned ln( pjt
Pmt
) when introducing the additional
term
P
ij(ln(
pjt
Pmt
))2 in the regression.
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that outlet specic demand shocks for an item do not a¤ect the price of that item at the chain level.8 Of
course, against these explanations one could argue that the supplier may know in advance that demand
will be high or low, so that he can already at the moment of price setting x an appropriate price. We
see no strong evidence for this hypothesis however. Important demand shocks should be captured by
the circular dummies (Cjt) and the item specic holiday dummies (it) in our regressions. They will
not show up in the error term. In the same vein, the included xed e¤ect im captures the inuence
on expenditure shares of time-invariant product specic characteristics which will also a¤ect the price
charged by the retailer. Therefore, item specic characteristics will not show up in the error term of
the regressions either. Robustness tests that we discuss in Section 3.4. provide further support for our
assumption that prices pit are uncorrelated with the error term "imt. Including additional dummies
(seasonal dummies) to capture demand shifts related to the time of the year does not a¤ect our results
in any serious way. Also, using IV methods and instrumenting prices, we obtain very similar results as
the ones reported below.
Following Hausman et al. (1994) we estimate Equation (14) imposing homogeneity and symmetry
from the outset (i.e.
5X
j=1
ij = 0 and ij = ji). We also impose symmetry on the e¤ects of the circular
dummies (i.e. 'ij = 'ji). Finally, the adding up conditions (
5X
i=1
im = 1;
5X
i=1
ij = 0,
5X
i=1
i = 0,
5X
i=1
ij = 0,
5X
i=1
'ij = 0) allow us to drop one equation from the system. We drop the equation for
"other".
3.3 Results
Estimation of Equation (14) for 28 product categories over six outlets, with each product category
containing four items, generates 672 estimated elasticities and curvatures. Since 6 of these elasticities
were implausible, we decided to drop them, leaving 666 plausible estimates.9
8Hausman et al. (1994) and Hausman (1997) make a similar assumption. See our brief discussion in Section 3.4.
9These 6 price elasticities were lower than -10 (where our denition is such that the elasticity for a negatively sloped
demand curve should be a positive number). Note that we do not include the estimated elasticities and curvatures for the
composite otheritem in our further discussion. Due to the continuously changing composition of this otheritem over
time, any interpretation of the estimates would be di¢ cult.
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First, as we cannot discuss explicitly the 666 estimated elasticities and curvatures, we present our
results in the form of a histogram in Figures 1 and 2. In Appendix 5 we provide additional data on
the distribution of related adjusted R2 and Durbin-Watson test statistics, supporting the quality of
our estimates. We nd that the unweighted median price elasticity is 1.4. The unweighted median
curvature is 0.8. If we weight our results with the turnover each item generates, we do not nd very
di¤erent results. We nd a median weighted elasticity of 1.2 and a median weighted curvature of 0.8.
Considering the values that general equilibrium modelers impose when calibrating their models, these
are low numbers (see Table 1). The elasticities that we nd are also a bit low in comparison with the
existing empirical literature (see Bijmolt et al., 2005). Bijmolt et al. (2005) test various hypotheses
explaining why estimated elasticities may be low. Among others, these relate to product category
e¤ects, e¤ects from including advertising or promotion dummies and estimation method e¤ects. The
main reason for our relatively low price elasticity concerns the product categories that we could draw
from our dataset. Food, which is typically less price elastic, is overrepresented (16 out of 28 categories).
The median estimated elasticity among all items belonging to food categories in our dataset is 1.06.
The median elasticity among all items belonging to 12 non-food categories is 1.95.10 The fact that
we include circular dummies in our regressions, and that advertisement in the circular most often goes
along with price promotions, is much less of an explanation for low price elasticities in our dataset.
Although the circular dummy might pick up part of the price e¤ect, we hardly see this in our regressions.
Excluding circular dummies implies higher elasticities, but the increase is very small (about +0.3).
Estimation method e¤ects do not seem to matter either for our results. Bijmolt et al. (2005) point
to the possibility of positive correlation between demand shocks and prices. If the estimation method
does not take this into account, estimated elasticities will be biased downward. For reasons mentioned
above, and given our additional robustness checks in Section 3.4., we see no evidence for the hypothesis
of correlation between prices and the error term in our regressions. Moreover, re-estimating Equation
10Distinguishing durable and non-durable goods categories reveils parallel di¤erences, with elasticities being much
higher for durable goods. In line with the high fraction of food categories, the share of durables in our dataset is relatively
small.
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(14) with IV-methods hardly a¤ects the estimated elasticities. As a nal test on the potential impact
of estimation methods and the quality of estimation results, we calculated the median elasticity and
curvature parameters conditional on good test statistics for autocorrelation and for the explanatory
power of the model (R2). Appendix 5 summarizes these results. Again, elasticity and curvature are
hardly a¤ected.
Figure 3 and Table 4 bring more structure in our estimation results. Excluding some extreme val-
ues for the curvature, Figure 3 reveals that the estimated price elasticity and curvature are strongly
positively correlated. The correlation coe¢ cient is 0.53.11 In Table 4 we report the unweighted me-
dian elasticity and curvature, and their correlation, conditional on the elasticity taking certain values.
The condition that the elasticity is strictly higher than 1 corresponds to the approach in standard
macroeconomic models. When we impose this condition, the median estimated price elasticity is 2.4,
the median estimated curvature 1.7. Estimated price elasticities between 3 and 6 go together with a
median curvature of 3.5, etc.
We can now reduce the uncertainty around the curvature parameter in calibrated macro models.
First, as we have summarized in Table 1, researchers typically impose price elasticities in the range from
3 to about 10. Our results in Table 4 reveal corresponding values for the curvature of the same order
of magnitude, ranging respectively from about 2 to about 11. There does not seem to be any empirical
ground for curvature parameters of 33 or more. Second, considering all the empirical evidence on price
elasticities, even a curvature parameter of 10 would be hard to justify. The large survey of studies by
Bijmolt et al. (2005) reveals a median price elasticity of about 2.2. Only 9% of estimated elasticities
exceed 5. More or less in line with these results, the recent industrial organization literature reports
price-cost mark-ups that are consistent with price elasticities between 3 and 6 (see e.g. Domowitz et
al., 1988; Konings et al., 2001; Dobbelaere, 2004). Combining these results with our ndings in Table
11Figure 3 excludes 38 observations with an estimated curvature higher than 40 or lower than -40. If we exclude only
observations with a curvature above +60 or below -60, the correlation is 0.51. Note that most of the extreme estimates
for the curvature occur when the estimated price elasticity is very close to zero. Relatively small changes in the absolute
value of the elasticity then result into huge percentage changes in the elasticity and, according to our denition, high
curvature.
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4, a very sensible value to choose for the curvature would be around 4. Note that this value is fairly
robust to changes in our selection of product categories. Our interpretation of Figure 3 and Table 4
allows us to overcome the bias on our median estimates that may result from an overrepresentation of
low-elasticity product categories. Clearly, a value for the curvature of 4 is far below current practice
(see again Table 1). Only Bergin and Feenstra (2000) impose a lower value. Our ndings are fully
consistent, however, with Klenow and Willis (2006) who observe that the joint assumption of realistic
idiosyncratic shocks and a curvature of 10 is not compatible with actual nominal and relative price
changes in US data.
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Table 4: Estimated Price Elasticity and Curvature
Unconditional Conditional
" > 1 2 < "  4 3 < "  6 4 < "  8 8 < "  12
Median Elasticity 1.4 2.4 2.8 3.7 4.9 9.8
Median Curvature 0.8 1.7 2.0 3.5 5.4 11.1
Fraction  < 0 42% 26% 15% 8% 0% 0%
N.obs. 666 410 163 101 50 15
Second, our estimated curvatures show that the constant elasticity Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) benchmark
is too simplistic. Over the broad range of product categories that we have studied, convex and concave
demand curves coexist. We observe a negative curvature for 42% of the items. About 27% of our
estimated curvatures are below -2, 38% are above +2. The high frequency of non-zero estimated
curvatures, including many negative curvatures, supports our argument that the original AIDS model
is too restrictive to answer our research question. A key parameter in our behavioral extension is ii
(see our discussion of Equation (8)). Additional tests show that this extension makes sense. We nd
the estimated ii to be statistically di¤erent from zero at the 10% signicance level for 43% of the
items. Furthermore, a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that 11 = 22 = 33 = 44 = 0 at the
5% signicance level for two thirds of the included product categories. Appendix 6 provides details. A
macroeconomic model that ts the microeconomic evidence well should thus ideally allow for sectors
with di¤ering elasticities and curvatures.
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Third, in order to nd out whether a concave demand curve gives rise to stickier prices, we check
whether there is a link between our results on the curvature/elasticity and the size/frequency of price
adjustment. In other words, does the supplier act di¤erently for products with a high curvature
compared to products with a low curvature, as the theory on strategic complementarity would suggest.
We computed the correlation between the statistics on nominal price adjustment presented in Table 2
with the 666 estimated elasticities and curvatures. Table 5 reports the results. Only the correlation
between the price elasticity of demand and the size of price adjustment is signicantly negative for
both the cases including and excluding markdowns. Correlation is very weak however. Furthermore,
our estimated curvatures are not correlated with either the frequency or the size of price adjustment.
This nding applies irrespective of including or excluding markdowns. It also applies irrespective of
any condition on the level of the curvature (e.g.  > 0) or the elasticity (e.g. " > 1). One must not
overestimate the importance of this lack of correlation. An issue that might drive this result is the fact
that our data refer to a multi-product rm. Midrigan (2006) documents that multi-product stores tend
to adjust prices of goods in narrow product categories simultaneously. Price adjustment of individual
items in a multi-product rm is also a function of the shocks and price adjustment frictions of the entire
product category to which the item belongs. This kind of coordination will break the potential relation
between individual itemscurvatures and frequency and size of price adjustment.
Table 5: Correlation with Nominal Price Adjustment Statistics
Including Markdowns Excluding Markdowns
Frequency Size Frequency Size
Elasticity 0:04  0:09  0:10  0:15
Curvature 0:02 0:00 0:00 0:02
Note: The correlations in this Table are calculated using the 666
item elasticity/curvature estimates and their corresponding size
and frequency of price adjustment. An asterisk signals that the
correlation coe¢ cient is signicant at the 5% signicance level.
The column Excluding Markdowns indicates that the size and
frequency of price adjustment were calculated discarding periods
of temporary price markdowns.
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3.4 Robustness
We test the robustness of our results in various ways. First, we have changed the estimation methodol-
ogy. The assumption underlying the use of SUR is that prices pit in Equation (14) are uncorrelated to
the error term "imt. Although we believe we have good reasons to make this assumption, we drop it as
a robustness check, and re-estimate our model using an IV method. Ideally, one can use information on
costs, e.g. material prices, as instruments. However, data on a su¢ cient number of input prices with
a high enough frequency is generally not available. Hausman et al. (1994) and Hausman (1997), who
also use prices and quantities in di¤erent outlets, solve this problem by exploiting the panel structure
of their data. They make the identifying assumption that prices in all outlets are driven by common
cost changes which are themselves independent of outlet specic variables. Demand shocks that may
a¤ect the price of an item in one outlet are assumed not to a¤ect the price of that item in other out-
lets. Prices in other outlets then provide reliable instruments for the price in a specic outlet. This
procedure cannot work in our setup since prices are identical across outlets. As an alternative we use
once to three times lagged prices pi and once lagged relative prices
pi
P  as instruments. Considering
that autocorrelation is generally no problem in our basic regressions (see Appendix 5) lagged prices are
valid instruments. Re-estimating our model for a large subset of the included product categories with
the 3SLS methodology, we obtain very similar results for the elasticities and curvatures.
As a second robustness check we introduce seasonal dummies to capture possible demand shifts
related to the time of the year. As we mentioned before, when suppliers are aware of such demand
shifts they may x their price di¤erently. Not accounting for these demand shifts may then introduce
correlation between the price and the error term, and undermine the quality of our estimates. Re-
estimating our model with additional seasonal dummies does not a¤ect our results in any serious way
either.
Third, we allow for gradual demand adjustment to price changes by adding a lagged dependent
variable to the regression. Although often statistically signicant, we generally nd the estimated
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parameter on this lagged dependent variable to be between +0.1 and -0.1. Gradual adjustment seems
to be no important issue in our dataset.
Fourth, our results are based on the assumption that the aggregate price (P t ) is the relevant
reference price when consumers make their choice. This assumption is in line with the approach in
standard macro models. In the marketing literature, however, it is often assumed that reference prices
are given at the time of choice (see e.g. Putler, 1992; Bell and Latin, 2000). As a fourth robustness
test we have therefore assumed the reference price to be equal to the one-period lagged aggregate price
P t 1. Re-estimating our model for a subset of product categories we nd that this alternative has no
inuence on the estimated price elasticities. It implies slightly higher estimated curvatures for most
items, however without a¤ecting any of our conclusions drawn above12.
A nal check on the reliability of our results considers potential implications of the way we specify
and introduce "other". Although necessary to make estimation manageable, introducing "other" im-
poses a large number of restrictions on the regression. In Appendix 7 we report additional statistics
showing that there is no correlation at all between the market share of "other" in a product cate-
gory and the average estimated elasticity and curvature for the four items in that product category.
The estimated elasticity and curvature are not correlated either with the total number of items in the
category.
4 Conclusion
The failure of nominal frictions to generate persistent e¤ects of monetary policy shocks has led to
the development of models that combine nominal and real price rigidities. Many researchers recently
introduce a kinked (concave) demand curve as an attractive way to obtain real price rigidities. However,
the literature su¤ers from a lack of empirical evidence on the extent of curvature in the demand curve.
This paper uses scanner data from a large euro area supermarket chain to estimate the curvature of a
12Assuming that the reference price equals P t 1 a¤ects the equation for the curvature. Instead of Equation (11) it then
holds that i = @ ln "i@ ln pi =
("i 1)("i 1 i) 2ii=si
"i
.
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large number of items.
First, as is typical for studies with micro data, we nd wide variation in the estimated curvature of
demand among items/product categories. We observe both items with a convex and a concave demand
curve. This result would ideally be matched with a model with heterogeneous rms that can match
the entire distribution of curvatures. Our results also support the introduction of a kinked (concave)
demand curve in a representative rm economy, but the median degree of curvature is much lower
than currently calibrated. This nding is consistent with Klenow and Willis (2006) who nd that the
joint assumption of realistic idiosyncratic shocks and a curvature of 10 is not compatible with observed
nominal and relative price changes in US data.
Second, exploiting the heterogeneity in the estimates, we do not nd that items with a di¤erent
curvature have a di¤erent frequency or size of nominal price adjustment in our data. In case strategic
complementarity a¤ects price setting these should be correlated. The fact that our data stems from a
multi-product retailer may explain this lack of correlation. Midrigan (2006) argues that the item-specic
frequency and size of price adjustment in a multi-product rm are also a function of the shocks and
price adjustment frictions of the entire product category to which the item belongs. This could explain
why the relation between item-specic statistics of price adjustment and the estimated elasticities and
curvatures is disturbed in our data.
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Appendix 1: Di¤erent Curvatures
Curvature is not dened homogeneously across the di¤erent papers in the literature on price rigidity.
In this appendix we derive the relationships between the alternative denitions. These relationships
underly some of the parameter values that we report in Table 1 in the main text. We use the following
notation: xi = qi=Q is rm is relative output, pi is its price, "(xi) is the (positive) price elasticity of
demand, (xi) =
"(xi)
"(xi) 1 is the rms desired markup. Assuming an aggregate price level equal to 1, pi
also indicates the rms relative price.
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) and Smets and Wouters (2007) dene curvature as we have done as
the elasticity of the price elasticity of demand with respect to the relative price at steady state:
 =

@"(xi)
@pi
pi
"(xi)

xi=1
(15)
Coenen, Levin and Christo¤el (2006) dene the curvature of the demand curve as the relative slope of
the price elasticity of demand around steady state:
 =

 @"(xi)
@xi

xi=1
(16)
It can be shown that in steady state both approaches are identical:
@"(xi)
@pi
pi
"(xi)
=
@"(xi)
@pi
pi
"(xi)
@xi
@xi
xi
xi
=
@"(xi)
@xi
pi
xi
@xi
@pi
xi
"(xi)
=  @"(xi)
@xi
"(xi)
xi
"(xi)
Evaluated at steady state (xi = 1), this is equal to  @"(xi)@xi .
Kimball (1995) and Woodford (2005) characterize the curvature in the demand curve by the elas-
ticity of the rms desired markup with respect to relative output at steady state, i.e.
 =

@(xi)
@xi
xi
(xi)

xi=1
(17)
The relationship between  and  is as follows:
 =

@(xi)
@xi
xi
(xi)

xi=1
=


@(xi)
@"(xi)
@pi
@xi
xi
pi
"(xi)
(xi)

xi=1
=


1
("(xi)  1)2
1
"(xi)
("(xi)  1)

xi=1
=

("(1)  1) "(1)
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Kimball (1995) assumes  = 4:28 and "(1) = 11. Woodford imposes  = 0:13 and "(1) = 7:67.
The approach in Chari et al. (2000) is very close to Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), Coenen,
Levin and Christo¤el (2006) and Smets and Wouters (2007). Cost minimization by households buying
di¤erentiated products i to achieve optimal composite consumption Q yields the following rst order
condition for demand:
pi =

Q
G0(xi)
with  the Lagrangian lambda on the constraint relating household composite consumptionQ to individ-
ual quantities qi, G the Kimball (1995) aggregator function for composite consumption and (as dened
before) xi = qi=Q. Rewriting this rst order condition, we obtain the demand curve xi = D(piQ=)
with D = (G0) 1. The price elasticity of demand equals
"(xi) =  D
0(G0(xi))G0(xi)
xi
Evaluated at steady state this is "(1) =  D0(G0(1))G0(1). The curvature of the demand curve at steady
state can then be obtained as:
 =

 @"(xi)
@xi

xi=1
= D
00
(G0(1))G
00
(1)G0(1) +G
00
(1)D
0
(G
0
(1)) D0(G0(1))G0(1)
Since D0(G0(1)) = 1=G00(1) it follows that
 =
D
00
(G0(1))G0(1)
D0(G0(1))
+ 1 + "(1)
Chari et al. (2000) dene their curvature parameter  as
 =  D
00
(G0(1))G0(1)
D0(G0(1))
; (18)
from which the relationship with  is:
 =  + 1 + "(1) (19)
Chari et al. (2000) state a value of -289 for  and 10 for "(1). According to Equation (19) this would
imply  = 300. The discrepancy with the value of 385 that we report in Table 1 is due to the fact that
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Chari et al. (2000) use a rst order Taylor series expansion of the demand elasticity around the steady
state to calculate their curvature parameter  associated with the Kimball (1995) parameterisation.
The exact value of  would be -374.
Finally, Bergin and Feenstra (2000) derive a concave demand curve from assuming preferences with
a translog functional form. The (positive) own price elasticity of demand is "i = 1   iisi with si the
expenditure share of good i and ii = @si=@ ln pi < 0. Along the lines set out in Section 3.1. of this
paper it can be derived that  = ("i 1)
2
"i
. Starting from the imposed "(1) = 3,  should be 1:33.
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Appendix 2: Description of Dataset
Table 6 gives an overview of the 58 product categories that are in the dataset that we use in this paper.
Between brackets we indicate the number of items within each category. The available data for all these
categories have been used to compute the basic statistics in Section 2. Product categories in italic are
also included in the econometric analysis in Section 3.
Table 6: Product Categories and Number of Items
Drinks: tea (67), coke (39), chocolate milk (9), lemonade (33), mineral water (66), wine (17)
port wine (54), gin (21), fruit juice (54), beer (6), whiskey (82)
Food: cornakes (49), tuna (46), smoked salmon (18), biscuit (9), mayonnaise (45), tomato
soup (5), emmental cheese (56), gruyere cheese (19), spinach (29), margarine (62), potatoes (26),
liver torta (98), baking our (18), spaghetti (30), co¤ee biscuits (5), minarine (2)
Equipment: airing cupboard (61), knife (19), hedge shears (32), dishwasher (43), washing
machine (36), tape measure (15), tap (24), dvd recorder (20), casserole (74), toaster (40)
Clothes and related: jeans (79), jacket (88)
Cleaning products: dishwasher detergent (43), detergent (43), soap powder (98), oorcloth (11)
toilet soap (34)
Leisure and education: hometrainer (52), football (32), cartoon (86), dictionary (32),
school book (34)
Personal care: plaster (33), nail polish (15), handkerchief (63), nappy (64), toilet paper (13)
Other: potting soil (33), cement (43), bath mat (48), aluminium foil (5)
Note: The number of items in a particular product category is stated in brackets. Only the product
categories in italic are included in the econometric analysis in Section 3.
Our econometric analysis in Section 3 includes four items per product category and a composite of
all other items in the category, called "other". Including more than four items could make sense from
the perspective of covering a larger share of the market. However, it would also imply an ination of
coe¢ cients to be estimated. Moreover, since the price of each item occurs as an explanatory variable in
the expenditure share equation of all included items within the product category, raising the number
of items could limit estimation capacity when additional items have shorter or non-overlapping data
availability. Our criteria to select the four items per product category reect these concerns. These
criteria are (long) data availability and (relatively high) market share within the category.13 More
precisely, we ranked all items within the category on the basis of the total number of observations
available (the maximum being 86), and chose those items with the highest number of observations.
13Note that both these criteria are strongly (positively) correlated.
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Among items with an equal number of observations we selected those with the highest market share.
If this procedure implied di¤erent selections among the six available outlets, we chose those products
with the best ranking in most outlets.
The market share of "other" has been constructed as
sother =
Xother
X
=
NX
j =2S4
pjqj
X
with S4 the selected four items, and all other variables as dened in the main text. The price index of
"other" is the Stone index for all items included in "other".
pother =
NX
j =2S4
sjpj
with sj = pjqj=Xother. Due to di¤erent weights pother will di¤er across the six outlets.
The reduction to 28 product categories in the econometric analysis in Section 3, coming from 58,
has been driven by the following criteria. For a category to be included in the econometric analysis
we required (i) data availability in all six outlets, (ii) the four selected items to have a total market
share of at least 20% in their product category and (iii) the four selected items to show su¢ cient price
variation. Over the whole time span the four items together should show at least 20 price changes of at
least 5%, where we counted the typical V-pattern of a price markdown as 1 price change. At least 3 of
these price changes should be regular price changes. The minimum market share requirement should
make certain that the chosen four items are important within their category. This should raise the
relevance of our estimates. Su¢ cient price variation is an obvious requirement if one wants to estimate
a demand curve accurately.
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Appendix 3: Identication of Markdowns
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the identication of markdowns for an individual item of potatoes and
lemonade. We dene a markdown as a sequence of three, two or one price(s) that are/is below both the
most left adjacent price and the most right adjacent price. To calculate our excluding markdowns
statistics in Section 2, we have ltered out markdown prices. We have replaced them by the last
observed regular price.
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Figure 4: Price for Potato Item Including and Excluding Temporary Markdowns and Quantities
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Appendix 4: Derivation of Curvature in the Behavorial AIDS Model
Starting from Equation (8)
"i(LA=B AIDS) = 1 
ii
si
+ i  
2ii ln(
pi
P  )
si
+ 2
NX
j=1
ij ln(
pj
P 
)
the derivation of the curvature goes as follows:
i(LA=B AIDS) =
@ ln "i
@ ln pi
=   1
"i
@
0@ii+2ii ln( piP )
si
  2
NX
j=1
ij ln(
pj
P  )
1A
@ ln pi
=   1
"i
0@2ii(1  si)si   (@si=@ ln pi)(ii + 2ii ln( piP  ))
si2
  2(ii   si
NX
j=1
ij)
1A
=   1
"i
0@2ii(1  si)
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+ ("i   1)
0@1  "i + i + 2 NX
j=1
ij ln(
pj
P 
)
1A  2(ii   si NX
j=1
ij)
1A
In the third line we again use the (empirically supported) assumption that @ lnP

@ ln pi
= si. The fourth
line relies on the denition that  @si=si@ ln pi = ("i   1) and the result derived from Equation (8) that
ii
si
+
2ii ln(
pi
P )
si
= 1  "i + i + 2
NX
j=1
ij ln(
pj
P  ). Rearranging and imposing the steady state assumption
that all relative prices are 1, we nd for the curvature that
i(LA=B AIDS) =
1
"i
0@("i   1) ("i   1  i)  2ii(1  si)si + 2(ii   si
NX
j=1
ij)
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Appendix 5: Distribution of adjusted R2 and Durbin Watson
The two gures below and Table 7 show the distribution of the adjusted R2 and the Durbin Watson
statistic over our 666 estimated regressions (28 product categories, 4 items per category, 6 outlets and
excluding 6 observations with an elasticity below -10). For a very large majority of our estimates the
null hypothesis of autocorrelation in the error term can be rejected.
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Figure 6: Adjusted R-square
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Figure 7: Durbin Watson statistic
Table 7: Estimated Price Elasticity and Curvature
25% 50% 75% 90%
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.26 0.45 0.63
DW 1.43 1.72 2.06 2.30
Note: The data show the adjusted R2 and
the Durbin Watson statistic of the regressions
(among 666) at the 25th, 50th and 75th per-
centile, ordered from low to high.
Table 8 summarizes our estimates for the price elasticity and the curvature conditional on goodtest
statistics for the adjusted R2 and the Durbin Watson statistics. Conditioning on better test statistics
hardly a¤ects our results for the median estimated elasticity and curvature. At best, we see a rise in
the estimated elasticity with increasing R2, but this rise is small.
Table 8: Estimated Price Elasticity and Curvature
Unconditional Conditional
AdjR2 > 0 AdjR2 > 0:2 AdjR2 > 0:4 1:5 < DW < 2:5
Median Elasticity 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.4
Median Curvature 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.6
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Appendix 6: Estimation Results for ii
The two gures below show the distribution of the 112 (=28x4) estimated values for ii and the
distribution of the related absolute t-values. The table contains the results of a Wald test for each
of the 28 product categories of the joint hypothesis that 11 = 22 = 33 = 44 = 0. The results are
briey discussed in the main text.
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Figure 8: Point Estimates ii
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Figure 9: t-values ii
Table 9: Wald Test for 11 = 22 = 33 = 44 = 0
p-value p  0.05 0.05< p  0.1 0.1< p  0.2 0.2< p
Number of product categories 19 2 4 3
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Appendix 7: Size of "Other" and Estimation Results
This appendix reveals that there is no specic relationship between our estimation results for the elas-
ticity and the curvature in a product category and the number of items not included in the regressions.
The table below contains all relevant correlation coe¢ cients, the gures illustrate two of the results
involving curvature.
Table 10: Pairwise Correlation Coe¢ cients over 28 Product Categories
Market Share "Other" Number of Items Median Elasticity Median Curvature
Market Share "Other" 1 - - -
Number of Items 0.61 1 - -
Median Elasticity -0.06 -0.19 1 -
Median Curvature -0.03 0.06 0.56 1
Median ii 0.12 -0.19 -0.29 -0.78
R2 = 0.0011
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Figure 10: Curvature vs. Market Share
"Other"
R2 = 0.004
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Number of items in a category
M
ed
ia
n 
cu
rv
at
ur
e
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Abstract
In this paper I show that in an economy with sticky prices and high labor taxes, optimal ination
volatility is signicantly higher than for an economy with low labor taxes. Because the marginal
revenue decreases in the level of labor taxes, the Ramsey planner needs to raise taxes more to nance
the same adverse government spending shocks. This creates a larger tax distortion than under a low
level of labor taxes. To minimize overall distortions the planner changes taxes less than is needed
to entirely nance the increase in spending and generates a surprise ination to raise revenue from
inating the nominal public debt.
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1 Introduction
It is a well known fact that in Europe labor taxes are much higher than in the United States. Prescott
(2002, 2004) argues that high labor taxes can largely explain the low labor market participation in
Europe. In this paper I ask the question whether the level of labor taxes can a¤ect the way scal and
monetary policy should be conducted.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b) and Siu (2004) study optimal scal and monetary policy in
environments with nominal rigidities, imperfect competition, nominal non-state-contingent government
debt and distortionary income taxes. In this environment the Ramsey planner faces a trade-o¤ in
choosing the path of ination in response to government spending shocks. On the one hand, the
planner likes to use unexpected ination as a non-distorting tax on nominal wealth. In this way, the
scal authority can minimize the need to vary distortionary income taxes over the business cycle. On
the other hand, changes in the rate of ination come at a cost, for rms face nominal rigidities. They
nd that under plausible calibrations of the degree of price stickiness, this trade-o¤ is robustly resolved
in favor of price stability. This is exactly the opposite of the result of Chari et al. (1991) who assume
exible prices. With exible prices they nd that it is optimal to use ination as a tax on nominal
wealth to nance government spending shocks. This is intuitive because price adjustment is costless so
that the planner does not face a trade-o¤ between labor taxes and ination.
These results are all obtained for an economy like the United States where average labor taxes
are around 30%, compared to Europe where average labor taxes are around 40%. Moreover, a lot of
European countries have average labor tax rates close to 50%. Trabandt and Uhlig (2007) document
that because labor taxes in Europe are higher than in the United States, Europe is much closer to the
peak of the labor tax La¤er curve. Close to the peak of the La¤er curve the slope is much atter than
at lower levels of taxation. This implies that the marginal revenue of a 1% tax increase is much lower.
The planner needs to raise taxes much more to collect the same amount of revenue. This creates a
larger tax distortion than under low labor taxes. The planner then prefers to change taxes less than is
2
required to nance the increase in spending and prefers to generate a surprise ination to raise revenue
from inating the nominal public debt. The policy recommendation under sticky prices (Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe, 2004b) is to a large extent reverted back to the one made under exible prices (Chari et
al, 1991). I nd that the volatility of ination for an economy with high labor taxes and sticky prices
is about half that of an economy with low taxes and exible prices. The volatility of ination for an
economy with low taxes and sticky prices is negligible.
Siu (2004) nds that for wartime or large shocks to government spending the optimal policy is to
inate the nominal public debt, but arrives at the same conclusion as Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b)
for peacetime or small shocks to government spending. Again this is for a calibration of an economy
with a relatively low level of labor taxes. In this paper I do not compare two economies with a di¤erent
size of shocks. I compare two economies with the same size of shocks, but with di¤erent levels of
labor taxes. So instead of a wartime vs. peacetime comparison for the United States, this paper is a
comparison of optimal policy for peacetime United States and Europe.
Section 2 presents the model and explains how the interaction between the degree of monopolistic
competition and the level of labor taxes results into a La¤er curve. Section 3 shows how the level of
labor taxes a¤ects the optimal Ramsey policy. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
I use the same model as Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b), except for the price setting mechanism.
Instead of Rotemberg (1982) adjustment costs I use Calvo (1983) price setting. There are three distor-
tions in the model. First, the distortion from labor taxes, second the distortion from transaction costs,
third the relative price distortion. I choose a time unit of one quarter of a year. This is the usual choice
in the business cycle literature on monetary policy. One could argue that for the way scal policy is
conducted today this time unit is too small. Still, ministers meet as regularly as central bankers to
decide on policy. The level of government spending is assumed to be exogenous. It is the outcome of
a democratic process that is beyond the control of the policy maker. I restrict the presentation of the
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model to the key equations. Details on the rst order conditions characterizing the private decisions of
households and rms, as well as the optimal policy of the Ramsey planner are in Appendix A.
2.1 Households
Households maximize expected intertemporal utility as a function of consumption Ct and labor Ht.
The intertemporal discount factor is .
E0
1X
t=0
tU (Ct;Ht) (1)
Consumption purchases are subject to a proportional transaction cost s(vt) that depends on the house-
holds money-to-consumption ratio.
vt =
PtCt
Mt
This gives the households a reason to hold money. If money were not needed to do consumption
purchases, households would not be willing to hold a money stock on which they do not receive any
interest. Households purchase one-period nominal government bonds Bt and pay a proportional tax  t
on their wage. The ow budget constraint of the household is then given by:
PtCt [1 + s (vt)] +Mt +Bt =Mt 1 +Rt 1Bt 1 + (1   t)WtHt
The household is subject to a borrowing constraint that prevents it from engaging in Ponzi schemes:
lim
j!1
Etqt+j+1 (Rt+jBt+j +Mt+j)  0
at all dates. The variable qt represents the period-zero price of one unit of currency to be delivered in
period t and is given by
qt =
1
R1R2:::Rt 1
with q0  1.
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2.2 Firms
A retailer bundles a continuum of goods i 2 (0; 1) into an aggregate good Yt that can be used for either
private consumption Ct or government spending Gt:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (i)
" 1
" di
 "
" 1
with 1 < " <1
where " is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The technology function for a variety i is
linear in labor input Ht(i):
Yt(i) = ZtHt(i)
Labor Ht(i) to produce the specic varieties is hired from a perfectly competitive labor market. The
monopolist sets the price of the good it supplies, taking as given the level of aggregate demand. Once
the price is set the monopolist is constrained to satisfy demand at that price so that:
Yt(i) 

Pt(i)
Pt
 "
Yt
where " is the demand elasticity and is the same as the elasticity of substitution in the production
function of the retailer. Price adjustment is à la Calvo (1983). The probability that a rm cannot reset
its price is . The aggregate price level then has the form:
Pt =
h
P 1 "t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 "
i 1
1 "
The price setting problem of the rm i is to maximize future discounted prots/dividends:
max
P t (i)
( 1X
k=0
k

Qt;t+k
 
P t+k(i)Yt+k(i) Wt+kHt+k(i)
	)
The variable Qt;t+k is dened as:
Qt;t+k = 

U1 (Ct+k;Ht+k(i))
U1 (Ct;Ht(i))
Pt
Pt+k

2.3 Government
The government faces a stream of public spending, denoted Gt, that is exogenous, stochastic and
unproductive. These expenditures are nanced by levying labor income taxes at the rate  t, by printing
5
money, and by issuing one-period, risk free nominal bonds, denoted Bt. The governments ow budget
constraint is then given by:
Mt +Bt +  tWtHt =Mt 1 +Rt 1Bt 1 + PtGt
There is no perfect Ricardian equivalence in this model as the government can only raise revenue with
distortionary taxes. If the government could raise revenue with lump sum taxes, then the timing of
debt would be irrelevant (Barro, 1979). I keep the government sector in my model deliberately simple.
First, this is to keep the model comparable to the model used in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b),
and second to keep the intuition behind the result as simple as possible.
2.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium the following market clearing conditions need to hold:
Goods market clearing:
Yt = s (vt)Ct +Gt
Labor market clearing:
Ht =
Z 1
0
Ht (i)
The price level is dened as:
Pt =
h
P 1 "t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 "
i 1
1 "
2.5 Parameterization and Functional Forms
Most of the parameters I take from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) for a quarterly model frequency.
This paper mainly aims at illustrating the mechanism that generates higher optimal average ination
and a higher optimal standard deviation of ination. It is not my aim to match the European and
American data in all their dimensions.
Government spending is the only source of uncertainty.1 Government spending Gt is assumed to
1Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b) also consider technology shocks. In the interest of clarity I only focus on government
spending shocks.
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Table 1: Parameterization
Symbol Value Description
 2.9 Preference parameter
A 0.0267 Transaction cost parameter
B 0.1284 Transaction cost parameter
 0.99 Discount factor
" 4 Elasticity of substitution
G 0.87 Persistence government spending shock
Z 0.85 Persistence technology shock
G 0.016 Standard deviation govt spending shock
Z 0.0064 Standard deviation technology shock
b=Y 0.42 Steady state debt-to-GDP ratio (quarterly)
 0.75 Calvo price adjustment parameter
follow an AR(1) process in its logarithm,
lnGt = (1  G) lnG+ G lnGt 1 + "Gt with "Gt  N(0; 2"G)
As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b) I use the utility function:
U (Ct;Ht) = lnCt +  ln(1 Ht)
and the transaction cost function:
s(vt) = Avt +
B
vt
  2
p
AB
2.6 La¤er Curve
The model implies a La¤er curve for labor taxes. This happens through the interaction between
imperfect competition and labor taxes. Abstracting from consumption transaction costs, the steady
state labor H is determined by the equation below:
H =
(1  ) " 1"h


1  (" 1)"

+ (1  ) " 1"
i
H"=1 =
(1  )
[ (1  ) + (1  )] =
1
1 + 
In the case of perfect competition (" =1), the presence of labor taxes does not distort the equilibrium
labor allocation H"=1. The income and substitution e¤ect of higher taxes exactly cancel out. It is
only in the presence of imperfect competition that labor taxes distort the labor supply. Because of
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the imperfect competition distortion the income e¤ect of higher labor taxes does not fully compensate
the negative substitution e¤ect of higher labor taxes. That is because households receive monopoly
prots, so that with higher labor taxes their income does not fall to the same extent as their after tax
wage. This can also be seen in Figure 1, that illustrates how di¤erent degrees of competition a¤ect the
shape of the La¤er curve, and thus the level of marginal tax revenue. So even though I use preferences
consistent with balanced growth, due to the presence of monopolistic competition I nd a negative
e¤ect of higher labor taxes on labor supply. Jonsson (2007) investigates the steady state welfare costs
of imperfect competition and distortionary taxes for the United States. He nds that the combination
of imperfect competition and distortionary taxes creates a much higher welfare cost than the sum of
the welfare costs when both distortions occur in isolation. This is in line with the presence of a La¤er
curve here.
Figure 1: La¤er Curve and Demand Elasticity
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So it should be clear that it is not the choice of the utility function that generates the La¤er curve.
As long as preferences have the balanced growth property, there will only emerge a La¤er curve when
there is some degree of imperfect competition in the goods market. Another issue is how my results
might be a¤ected by the size of the labor supply elasticity. Exploring di¤erent parameter values for 
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in Figure 2 I nd that only the level of the La¤er curve is a¤ected. The elasticity of labor supply does
not substantially change the location of the tax rate that maximizes the tax revenue, which is what
counts for my result.
Figure 2: La¤er Curve and Labor Supply Elasticity
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Finally, it is justied to ask how the assumption on government spending a¤ects the shape of
the La¤er curve. Rogerson (2007) and Dhont and Heylen (2008) point out that taking into account
more elaborate, and thus more realistic, government taxation and spending can change the e¤ects of
taxation on hours worked. This will also a¤ect the location of the peak of the La¤er curve. Introducing
government transfers would shift the peak of the La¤er curve to the left, strengthening the relevance of
this paper. Introducing productive government spending (e.g. investment in public goods) would shift
the peak of the La¤er curve to the right, weakening the relevance of this paper. As in reality governments
spend their money on both transfers and productive government spending, it seems reasonable to assume
unproductive government spending.
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3 Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy
In this Section I analyze the Ramsey (1927) policy for the economy I outlined in the previous Section.
The Ramsey policy maximizes intertemporal utility given the decisions of households and rms. The
problem can be summarized in Lagrangian form by taking the FOCs of the private economy as con-
straints for the Ramsey solution. I refer to Appendix A for the details on the Ramsey problem and
its solution. I use a second order approximation to solve the model numerically with a perturbation
method. I use the software Dynare.
3.1 Optimal Long-Run Policy
Figure 3: Labor Taxes and Optimal Average Ination
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In Figure 3 I show that optimal steady state ination is increasing in the steady state labor tax
rate. This is due to the fact that nancing the government spending becomes increasingly distortionary
through labor taxes. It is optimal to use higher ination, which acts as an indirect tax on consumption,
to nance government spending. This is in line with Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) who explain that
the intuition behind the breakdown of the Friedman rule under imperfect competition is the following:
In the imperfectly competitive economy, part of income takes the form of pure monopoly rents. By
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denition, the labor income tax rate cannot tax prots. As a result, the social planner resorts to the
ination tax as an indirect way to tax prot income. When the household transforms prot income
into consumption, it must use at money, which is subject to the ination tax.
There is again a trade-o¤ though. As ination increases, the relative price distortion will also
increase. But this is balanced by the higher labor tax distortion. In steady state there can be no
taxation of nominal wealth through ination, as by denition there is no surprise ination. The nominal
interest rate will reect the higher ination rate.
3.2 Optimal Cyclical Policy
In this Section I present the results of a simulation exercise. The impulse response functions in Figure 4
and 5 show exactly the point of this paper. For low levels of labor taxes the Ramsey planner replicates
the result of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, and nances the government spending shock with higher taxes
and accumulates debt over time. For the case with high labor taxes the Ramsey planner increases
ination and in this way deates the real outstanding government debt. In the latter case ination
reacts more than in the rst case. This explains the result in Figure 6 where the optimal standard
deviation of ination increases with the level of labor taxes. Note that I rescale the standard deviation
of the government spending shock as the size of the government gets bigger. To keep the di¤erent
economies comparable I choose the same level size of shocks to government spending instead of the
percentage size of shocks. That is why the percentage change in government spending is smaller for
the case with high labor taxes.
The policy recommendation under sticky prices (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004b) is to a large
extent reverted back to the one made under exible prices (Chari et al, 1991). I nd that the volatility
of ination for an economy with high labor taxes and sticky prices is about half that of an economy
with low taxes and exible prices. The volatility of ination for an economy with low taxes and sticky
prices is negligible.
The (peak of the) La¤er curve acts as an upper bound on taxes, similar to the lower bound on
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses Low Labor Taxes
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Note: Impulse responses to a government spending
shock for a low level of labor taxes (29%).
nominal interest rates. Just like an economy with low ination rates will be more likely to hit the lower
bound on nominal interest rates, will an economy with high labor taxes be more likely to hit this upper
bound on taxes than an economy with low labor taxes. Upon reaching the peak of the La¤er curve the
policymaker will have to use rather unorthodox policy.
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses High Labor Taxes
10 20 30 40
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
pe
rc
en
t o
f s
te
ad
y s
ta
te
bonds
10 20 30 40
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
pe
rc
en
t
inflation (APR)
10 20 30 40
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
tax  rate
pe
rc
en
t
10 20 30 40
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
consumption
pe
rc
en
t o
f s
te
ad
y s
ta
te
10 20 30 40
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
pe
rc
en
t o
f s
te
ad
y s
ta
te
hours  worked
10 20 30 40
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
government expenditure
pe
rc
en
t o
f s
te
ad
y s
ta
te
Note: Impulse responses to a government spending
shock for a high level of labor taxes (60%).
4 Conclusion
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b) and Siu (2004) study optimal scal and monetary policy in environ-
ments with nominal rigidities, imperfect competition, nominal non-state-contingent government debt
and distortionary income taxes. They nd that under plausible calibrations of the degree of price
stickiness, this trade-o¤ is robustly resolved in favor of price stability.
These results are all obtained for an economy like the United States where average labor taxes are
about 30%. However, Trabandt and Uhlig (2007) document that because labor taxes in most European
countries are higher than in the United States, European countries are close to the peak of their labor
tax La¤er curves. Close to the peak of the La¤er curve the slope is much atter than at lower levels of
taxation. The planner then needs to raise taxes much more to collect the same amount of revenue. This
creates a larger tax distortion than under low labor taxes. The planner then prefers to change taxes
less than is required to nance the increase in spending and prefers to generate a surprise ination to
raise revenue from inating the nominal public debt. The policy recommendation under sticky prices
(Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004b) is to a large extent reverted back to the one made under exible
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Figure 6: Labor Taxes and Optimal Ination Variability
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prices (Chari et al, 1991). I nd that the volatility of ination for an economy with high labor taxes
and sticky prices is about half that of an economy with low taxes and exible prices. The volatility of
ination for an economy with low taxes and sticky prices is negligible.
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Appendix A: Optimality Conditions
Note that I here express all optimality conditions in real terms. I use small letters for nominal variables
that have been divided by the price level Pt.
Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is characterized by the 14 constraints below. They comprise the FOCs of
the households and the rms and the aggregate market clearing conditions.
(Ct)
1
Ct
=  t
2641 +
0@ACt
mt

+
B
Ct
mt
   2pAB
1A+
0B@A  B
Ct
mt
2
1CA Ct
mt
375 (2)
(mt)
1 
0B@A  B
Ct
mt
2
1CACt
mt
2
= 
t+1
t
1
t+1
(3)
(bt)
Rt =
1

t
t+1
t+1 (4)
(Ht)
 
(1 Ht)   t (1   t)wt = 0 (5)
(t)
0 = Ct
241 +ACt
mt

+
B
Ct
mt
   2pAB
35+mt + bt   mt 1
t
  Rt 1bt 1
t
(6)
  (1   t)wtHt   dt
(pt )
"x1t = ("  1)x2t (7)
 
x1t

x1t = (p

t )
 " Yt
wt
Zt
+ 
t+1
t

pt
pt+1
1
t+1
 "
x1t+1 (8)
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 
x2t

x2t = (p

t )
 " Ytpt + 
t+1
t

pt (i)
pt+1(i)
1
t+1
1 "
x2t+1 (9)
Aggregate goods market clearing:
Yt =

1 +Avt +
B
vt
  2
p
AB

Ct +Gt (10)
and labor market clearing:
Ht =
Ytst
Zt
(11)
and the price level:
1 =
"


1
t
1 "
+ (1  ) (pt )1 "
# 1
1 "
(12)
dividends from sticky sector:
dt = Yt   wt
Zt
Ytst (13)
and:
st = (1  ) (pt ) " +  (t)" st 1 (14)
Ramsey Policy
The Ramsey planner maximizes intertemporal utility (1) subject to the 13 constraints of the competitive
equilibrium just described in conditions (2)  (??). The problem in Lagrangian form looks like:
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
2664
U (Ct;Ht)
+1;t [2] + 2;t [3] + 3;t [4] + 4;t [5] + 5;t [6]
+6;t [7] + 7;t [8] + 8;t [9] + 9;t [10] + 10;t [11]
+11;t [12] + 12;t [13] + 13;t [14]
3775
This results in 13 additional Lagrange multipliers and 15 additional FOCs. Together with the com-
petitive equilibrium conditions this results in 28 constraints and 28 variables. I do not explicitly write
down the Ramsey FOCs here as these are automatically derived in my Matlab programs using the code
of Levin et al. (2005).
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